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Soviet and American Law on Religion:
Freedom of Conscience Versus
Free Exercise
By ELLEN RUTH HORNSTEIN
Associate, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Washington, D.C.; J.D.,
1986, Georgetown University; B.A., 1981, Tufts University.
Article 227 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
(RSFSR)1 Criminal Code imposes liability for using religion as a pretext
for organizing or participating in "antisocial" activity. Antisocial activ-
ity includes conduct that (a) causes harm to the health of citizens; (b)
infringes upon their rights; (c) encourages minors to join religious
groups; and (d) induces shirking of a required social activity or civic duty
or abstaining from an optional recreational activity.2
In 1967, the Soviet state prosecuted members of an evangelical
group in Alma-Ata3 for violations of Article 227.' Prosecutors alleged
that the group's leaders were advocating repeal of Soviet laws on religion.
This conduct was considered to be insurrectional and, therefore, a crime
against the state.' Prosecutors also asserted that the group's leaders were
1. The RSFSR is the largest of the fifteen republics in the federated Soviet system. Each
republic has a concentration of a particular ethnic group. The RSFSR has the largest popula-
tion of Russians, as distinct from the seventeen other major nationalities in the USSR. Mos-
cow and Leningrad are located in the RSFSR.
The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, the federal legislature, has enacted Fundamental
Principles of Criminal Legislation for the Soviet Union as a whole. The Soviet Constitution by
implication leaves the promulgation of criminal codes or statutes to the fifteen union republics.
Each union republic has adopted its own criminal code in general conformance with the all-
union legislation. H. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR
CODES 15-16 (1966).
2. UK RSFSR (CRIMINAL CODE) art. 227 (1965) [UK RSFSR (CRIMINAL CODE) will
hereinafter be referred to as RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE], reprinted in SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 125 (H. Berman & J. Spindler trans. 1972).
3. Alma-Ata is the capital of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.
4. Vorotynova, Under the Mask of the Meek and Humble, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,
Aug. 18, 1967, at 4, reprinted in J. HAZARD, P. MAGGS & I. SHAPIRO, THE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM: CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTATION AND HISTORICAL COMMENTARY 83-84 (1969).
5. RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE art. 70, 72. Advocating repeal of Soviet laws would fall
under article 70's prohibition on anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and article 72's ban on
participation in anti-Soviet organizations.
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corrupting the minds of children. The court found that the leaders of the
evangelical group were using religion as a pretext for threatening the
public order and were injuring the health of other citizens. The court
held that these activities constituted a violation of article 227.6
American law, like article 227, restricts religious conduct that
camouflages impermissible activity. In Gaskin v. Tennessee,7 a state
court barred the use of marijuana in religious ceremonies. Gaskin had
led 350 to 360 religious followers in a caravan of buses from San Fran-
cisco to Tennessee.8 State officers arrested Gaskin and the other defend-
ants after discovering cultivated marijuana plants on the property where
the religious group had set up camp. The defendant's conduct violated a
Tennessee state statute9 prohibiting the manufacture of marijuana. Gas-
kin claimed that the statute interfered with the group's first amendment
right to free exercise of religion.10
The court denied Gaskin's free exercise claim, reasoning that the
first amendment does not create a broad exemption from legislation
which prohibits "acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of
society."' 1 Like article 227, the Tennessee statute bans conduct harmful
to the general welfare. Like the Alma-Ata case, Gaskin outlaws religious
activity that serves as a pretext for conduct that society considers
immoral.
The Alma-Ata and Gaskin cases demonstrate that similarities exist
between Soviet and American law on religion. In both cases, the courts
viewed the religious conduct as a mask for impermissible activity. Conse-
quently, both courts imposed restrictions on religious freedom.
This Article contrasts Soviet and American law on religion. The
discussion highlights the similarities and differences between Soviet con-
stitutional guarantees and American first amendment rights. Part I of
this Article discusses the sources of Soviet law and explains the differ-
6. Vorotynova, supra note 4, at 4.
7. 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1973).
8. Id. at 523.
9. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-1409 to 52-1448 (1971).
10. 490 S.W.2d at 522-23. Gaskin testified that marijuana is:
... a way to meditation that helps us to pray and to understand our Creator and also
it helps us to see the truth in our personal problems and in our interactions with each
other and that when we have prayer we try to get as high as we can so that we all can
have the best vision we can so we can see what's going on; its [sic] a meditation thing,
it's well substantiated by people in religion that the experience that you can have
with marihuana [sic] is identical to the religious experience that you can have sponta-
neously without it.
Id. at 523.
11. Id. at 524 (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)).
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ences between common-law countries like the United States and civil-law
countries like the Soviet Union. Part II analyzes the ideology, law, and
politics underlying the Soviet and American legal systems. Part III con-
trasts the socialist and bourgeois concepts of rights. In Part IV, Soviet
and American law are directly compared.
The Article also compares Soviet and American politics, ideology,
and procedure. In general, both countries interpret law by reference to
ideology and tradition. Both have encroached upon the separation of
church and state. The amount of encroachment permitted, however, is
very different. While both countries place certain state interests higher
than interests of individuals, each strikes a different balance.
I. SOURCES OF SOVIET AND BOURGEOIS LAW
Like many Western European countries and the State of Louisiana
in the United States, the Soviet Union has a civil-law system. The pri-
mary sources of law in civil systems are codes and statutes. In common-
law systems, cases as well as statutes are sources of law. In civil-law
systems, the different areas of law are governed by a massive codification
and statutory scheme, adopted in accordance with the state's
constitution. 12
Court decisions are a key source of law in common-law systems.
Judges derive principles from prior cases addressing similar issues and
apply these principles to the case before them. Prior decisions in the
same jurisdiction on the same issues bind the court.13
Civil-law systems are characterized by the weak role of custom and
judicial precedent.14 Generally, judicial decisions in civil-law cases are
not binding on subsequent cases. Although they are not constrained by
the doctrine of stare decisis, civil-law judges do rely on precedent. Civil-
law judges are likely to follow lines of decision; frequently, single rulings
are ignored.15
In contrast to common-law systems, the facts of an individual case
are not nearly as important in civil-law systems as the abstract principle
which can be distilled from the line of precedent. 6 In fact, the binding
effect of precedent applies only to the applicable code law, not to the
12. C. Osakwe, Socialist Law 26 (1974) (unpublished course materials).
13. J. JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 1-3 (3d ed.
1985).
14. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 595 (1980).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 595-96.
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facts of the case.7
In the Soviet Union, as in other civil-law countries, courts are not
regarded as sources of law.18 Courts interpret legislation, but these inter-
pretations are not binding. The national legislature and the legislature of
each republic are constitutionally empowered to give the authoritative
interpretations of law.19
Soviet scholars attribute the Soviet system's reliance on statutes to
what they perceive as the sophistication of the statutory form of law.20
They maintain that other potential sources of law (including custom and
judicial and administrative decisions) do not comport with the high de-
gree of organization in socialist society.21 In addition, Soviet scholars
argue that statutes facilitate the creative role of socialist society in
planned economic, political, and cultural development. Statutes are used
to help build communism. Statutes help shape the present and future,
whereas custom and precedent preserve the past.22
II. IDEOLOGY, LAW, AND POLITICS
A. The Soviet Approach
The key difference between socialist law and bourgeois law23 -
which includes common and civil law in noncommunist countries24 -is
the ideological foundation. Socialist law rests on Marxism-Leninism
and, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles, must promote ad-
vancement toward communism.
Marxist doctrine provides the foundation for Soviet antireligious
propaganda.2 5 According to Marx, religion is the opiate of the people; it
17. Id. at 597. Civil-law courts treat many issues as factual that common-law courts
would treat as legal. This approach gives civil-law judges even more flexibility in their applica-
tion of precedents.




22. See generally infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing Marxism-Leninism
and law as a creative force in socialist systems).
23. Inga Markovits noted the difference between socialist and bourgeois law in Markovits,
Socialist vs. Bourgeois Rights-An East-West German Comparison, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 612
(1978). The distinction between socialist and bourgeois societies derives from Marxist theory.
24. Common law and civil law in noncommunist countries are similar in terms of cover-
age and substance. The differences in terminology and institutional structure stem from polit-
ical and social conditions of the past. There no longer exists a social, religious, moral, or
political basis for differentiating between the two systems. Today, the difference is more one of
form than of content. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 14, at 302.
25. Marx, The German Ideology: Part I, in the MARX-ENGELS READER 19 (R. Tucker
[Vol. 10
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clouds their perception of reality. He believed that religion pacifies and
humbles individuals and allows them to rationalize inequities and hard-
ships in life.26 Marx said that religion leads people to believe that they
should not even attempt to control their fate, because rewards come after
death to those who have suffered meekly and have accepted their bur-
dens.27 To Marx, a tactician and pragmatist, religious doctrine was
anathema because it reconciled the masses to their inferior condition and
impeded the upheaval of exploitative bourgeois society. 8
The Soviet antireligious posture stems from an aversion to the
church's important social and political role in Tsarist Russiaz9 and the
"unscientific" character of religious doctrine, which is based on blind
faith rather than on reason."0 Accordingly, the Soviets label their propa-
ed. 1972); G. ZHELEZNOGORSKII, SOVETSKAIA VLAST' I TSERKOV' (Soviet Power and the




29. G. ZHELEZNOGORSKII, supra note 25, at 19; THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITS
LAWS 209 (L. Hecht ed. 1983) [hereinafter Hecht]; A. BARMENKOV, supra note 25, at 13, 16,
18.
30. G. ZHELEZNOGORSKII, supra note 25, at 9-10, 81; Hecht, supra note 29, at 209; A.
BARMENKOV, supra note 25, at 13. Leo Hecht postulates that the Soviets have recognized the
appeal of the religious mystique to Russians historically. He argues that the Soviets have
exploited this appeal in their attempt to exalt the Party, Lenin, and communism to the status
of a religious belief.
Hecht also argues that all aspects of religious worship have a counterpart in Soviet soci-
ety: (1) God is Lenin, embalmed and on permanent display in Red Square and memorialized
in posters, paintings, plaques, statues, political pins, banners, and books. His word is studied,
revered (at least outwardly), and reproduced in mass quantities, and has gone virtually unchal-
lenged for 80 years. Like God, Lenin is omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient; (2) por-
traits sanctifying Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the current leadership represent modem-day icons;
(3) holy shrines are exemplified by the commemoratives to Lenin in all factories, institutions
and headquarters of public organizations; (4) the collected works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin
are holy writings; (5) eternal life is represented by the material manifestations (modem build-
ings, apartments, dams, and railroads) and spiritual phenomena (the development of the "new
Soviet man") of communist society; and (6) formal worship is approximated by required at-
tendance at political meetings, discussion groups, and ceremonies that glorify the virtues of
Marxism-Leninism. Hecht, supra note 29, at 209-10.
Albert Boiter agrees that communism, like religion, is a doctrine that must be accepted on
faith, with rites and rituals that are sacred, an ethic that prescribes behavior, a hierarchical
leadership, its own set of holy days (Independence Day, November 7th, and International
Workers' Day, May lst), and its own infidels (Trotsky and Bukharin).
Boiter claims nevertheless that communism cannot be a religion since it lacks a crucial
element of religion, namely an engagement of inner faith beyond mere intellectual conscious-
ness. Religion requires belief, ideology does not. Ideology can flourish without belief in slo-
gans and programs, so long as it has acquired outward recognition and acceptance. This is the
case of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, to which all pay homage but in which few believe. Boiter,
Religion in the Soviet Union in 8 THE WASHINGTON PAPERS Wo. 78, at 20-22.
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ganda "scientific atheism"; 31 they claim that their atheism "struggles not
against the believer, but against his unscientific, erroneous views."32
The Soviet state wages a pervasive antireligious propaganda cam-
paign, summed up in the two Russian words, "Boga nyet," or, "there is
no God."'33 Religious observance is not only discouraged but severely
persecuted.34 Believers and human rights leaders motivated by religious
belief are arbitrarily tried, convicted, and sentenced. They face abysmal
detention conditions, imprisonment, and exile.3 5
In a collective, classless society like the Soviet Union, there can be
no individual rights without corresponding duties. Rights bestowed by
the state are dependent on obligations performed in return.36 In this
sense, Soviet rights are correlative.
According to Marxist theory, law is subordinate to economics be-
cause it derives from philosophical, ethical, and religious thought which
is itself subordinate to economics.37 Law is a product of the prevailing
31. Soviet publications have featured publications of cosmonauts returning from space
flights proclaiming that there is no sign of God in outer space. In posters and paintings, dark-
ness is the standard metaphor for religious belief. Boiter, supra note 30, at 20.
32. G. GOL'sT, RELIGIIA I ZAKON (Religion and the Law) 7 (1975).
33. Boiter, supra note 30, at 20.
34. Russia has a long history of religious persecution. Prior to the Revolution in 1917,
government interference in the church was sanctioned by the state. The Russian Orthodox
Church was the officially established faith and was closely allied with the state. Other religions
were either barely tolerated or condemned. Anyone who did not adhere to Russian Orthodoxy
was also challenging the tsar's sovereignty.
Jews especially suffered. In 1903, for example, thousands of Jews were massacred on
Easter Sunday and Monday at Kishinyov. There were many other less famous mass killings or
pogroms. Also, Jews were forced to live in "the pale of settlement," a ghetto on the outskirts
of Kiev in the Ukraine, the original Muscovite territory. V. KUROYEDOV, CHURCH AND
RELIGION IN THE USSR 7-8 (1979); Hourwich, Religious Sects in Russia in THE CASE OF
RUSSIA: A COMPOSITE VIEW 341-43, 349-50 (J. Novicow, A. Rambaud, P. Roberts & V.
Simkovitch eds. 1905).
35. See generally IN QUEST OF JUSTICE 218, 221-26 (A. Brumberg ed. 1970); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE USSR: THEIR TREAT-
MENT AND CONDITIONS 30-45 (1980) [hereinafter PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE]. Unlike the
Soviet state, the United States has a favorable attitude toward religion as a moral force in
society. Students, for example, pledge allegiance to "one nation, under God." Nickels and
pennies are engraved with the words, "In God we trust." In keeping with this underlying
ideology, the state fosters diversity of religious belief, rather than pervasive atheism. In gen-
eral, Americans can believe what they want and can worship freely, wherever and however
they wish, subject to very few limitations. The broad religious freedom in American society
contrasts sharply with the persecution of religion in the Soviet Union.
36. A comparison can be made between the dialectical relationship of socialist rights and
duties with Hohfeld's theory of correlative rights and obligations in property law. Cf. Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16
(1913).
37. See generally Marx, supra note 25, at 157-64.
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socioeconomic relationships.3 8 Law is, therefore, subordinate to commu-
nist ideology, which defines socioeconomic conditions in a communist
society. Likewise, law is subordinate to the state. The state and the
Communist Party enjoy ideological legitimacy because, in effect, they
represent that ideology.39 According to one Soviet scholar, "law draws
its force, obtains its content, from the state."'  According to another
Soviet writer, "law is not above the state but emanates from it, and so-
cialist legality, likewise, is always the modus operandi of the socialist
state and cannot become an impediment to its realization of its historical
tasks."41
Classic Marxist theory views law as a transitory remnant of capital-
ism that will wither away with the state4' in the final stage of commu-
nism. Law is seen as a temporary expediency, essentially bourgeois in
nature, but necessary to maintain the power of the proletariat during the
transition to communism.43 In the 1930's, however, Stalin departed from
the Marxist view that domination by the proletariat was necessary to
effect the communist revolution.' Stalin argued that concentration of
political power in the state, as representative of the proletariat, was re-
quired to ensure and achieve the transition to the final stage of commu-
nism. Stalin recognized the importance of law in maintaining order and
strengthening the state. Moreover, he realized the usefulness of law in
38. THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 13 (A. Vyshinsky ed. 1948) [hereinafter Vyshinsky].
39. Article 6 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution discusses the primacy of the Party: "The
leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state
organizations and public organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.... The
Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the
development of society .... " KONST. SSSR art. 6 (1977) (USSR).
Even article 6's clause, "[a]ll party organizations shall function within the framework of
the Constitution of the USSR," places few limitations on the state or the Party. First, the
clause refers only to Party organizations, that is to the Party bureaucracy, not to the Party or
the state. Second, the phrase, "within the framework of," can be construed broadly so as not
to impose legal constraints on the Party or the state. Id. The Soviet Constitution is largely a
codification of crucial elements of the Party program. The Constitution is not binding upon
the state or the Party, however. It is binding only upon state agencies, socialist organizations,
and individuals. See C. Osakwe, supra note 12, at 41.
40. Vyshinsky, supra note 38, at 5.
41. Golunskii & Strogovich, The Theory of the State and Law in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHY 393 (H. Babb trans. 1951).
42. To Marxists, the state represents neither community nor individual interests. Rather,
the state represents the division of labor and class struggle, or the domination by one class of
all others, on a larger scale. Once communist revolution equalizes control of the means of
production, the division of labor and consequent class conflict will cease to exist, along with
the state which embodies them. Marx, supra note 25, at 124-25, 157; Engels, Socialism: Uto-
pian and Scientific in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 635 (R. Tucker ed. 1972).
43. H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 29-30 (1974).
44. Marx, supra note 25, at 125.
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legitimizing and consolidating his own power. Consequently, he de-
nounced classic Marxist theory as "legal nihilism" and promoted policies
entrenching law in Soviet society.45
B. The American Approach
The structure of the American legal system, like that of the Soviet
legal system, reflects underlying political and ideological goals. In
America, the underlying ideology is one of a neutral government struc-
ture through which divergent political forces exercise equal power.
Political power is diffused among the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government. 46 Theoretically, each branch keeps the other
two in check; no branch can completely dominate the others. Reliance
on both precedents and statutes as sources of law furthers this goal; the
judiciary keeps the other branches in check by reviewing their conduct.47
The American form of government promotes a democratic ideology,
just as the Soviet form of government promotes a Marxist-Leninist
ideaology. The American governmental structure, however, allows for
more diversity and individualism than the Soviet system. The prevailing
ideology focuses on the individual as opposed to the collective.48 In the-
ory, American democracy encourages a pluralistic society, rather than a
society characterized by uniformity and conformance to a single political
norm.49 In contrast to the Soviet system, law in the American system
acts as a limit on state power. Law is not subordinate to the state; the
state is subordinate to the law.50 The United States Constitution limits
the powers of the branches of government,"1 as well as the power of the
state to act against the individual.52
All political systems shape social conditions through the law. The
American and Soviet systems do not differ in this respect. They differ,
45. H. BERMAN, supra note 43, at 29-30. Vyshinsky, supra note 38, at 39-40, 52.
46. See, e.g., J. BURNS, T. CRONIN & J. PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 51-52
(9th ed. 1975).
47. Id. at 53-54.
48. See Markovits, supra note 23, at 614-25 (discussing individualism versus collectivism
in a comparison of bourgeois and socialist rights).
49. See, e.g., D. OLSON & P. MEYER, GOVERNING THE UNITED STATES 151-69 (2d ed.
1978) (discussing the role of interest groups in American government).
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (delineating congressional powers); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
(delineating executive powers); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating judicial powers).
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting federal government from abridging free speech
or free exercise of religion); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (barring federal and state government
from denying or abridging right to vote on basis of race).
[Vol. 10
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however, in their approach to building the ideal society. 3 The Soviet
Union, like the United States, is not a lawless society. The Soviet people
accept the legitimacy of their legal system, even if they do not always
view it as just.54
III. THE SOCIALIST AND BOURGEOIS
CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS
A. The Source of Socialist and Bourgeois Rights
Socialist and bourgeois human rights differ in four major respects:
(1) legal meaning and enforcement, (2) focus, (3) textual definition, and
(4) realization. Socialist and bourgeois rights have a different legal mean-
ing, deriving from a different political purpose. Socialist rights are policy
pronouncements: they represent standards for desirable goals and behav-
ior. They are defined by their social purpose.55
The enforcement of socialist rights is horizontal. It pits citizen
against citizen, not the citizen against the state. 6 The Soviet Constitu-
tion primarily regulates individual rather than state behavior. Under the
Soviet Constitution, individuals have no rights independent of their sta-
tus in the collective and can never override the interests of that collective.
Soviet constitutional rights are realized only through the state; they are
not enforced by constitutional limitations on state power.5 7
Even though rights are granted by the state, rights are not guaran-
teed against the state. The state determines what rights individuals pos-
sess and under what conditions they possess them.58 In this sense, the
53. J. HAZARD, SOVIET LAW AND WESTERN LEGAL SYSTEMS 3 (1970).
54. Id. at 6. Hazard argues that Soviet law resembles bourgeois law in that neither con-
form to norms like natural law that are held superior to the state. Unlike bourgeois law,
however, Soviet law holds the state above the law. Id.; see supra notes 38-41 and accompany-
ing text (discussing subordination of law to state).
55. Markovits, supra note 23, at 614-15. In a limited sense, the United States Constitu-
tion can be interpreted as a policy pronouncement representing a particular moral standard.
The Constitution can act as a limit on the kind of moralistic or value-oriented legislation
Congress or state legislatures can enact. For example, the United States Supreme Court has
held unconstitutional statutory attempts to ban all abortions. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
56. The text of the Soviet Constitution does not specify the scope of article 52's guarantee:
"incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited." KONST. SSSR art. 52
(1977) (USSR). In practice, however, article 52 is directed against individuals, not the state.
Markovits, supra, note 23, at 615-16. The provision checks individual, not state, incitement of
religious hatred. See infra notes 344-53 and accompanying text.
57. W. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 143 (1983).
58. Article 59 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution states that "(c]itizens' exercise of their
rights and freedoms is inseparable from the performance of their duties and obligations." Arti-
cles 60-69 specify the duties owed by citizens to the state. KONST. SSSR arts. 59-69 (1977)
1987]
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granting of a right is actually an invitation to the state to interfere, not a
weapon against state interference.59 For example, the state gives Soviet
citizens economic security in the form of guaranteed housing and em-
ployment. Citizens receive these benefits, however, only if they fulfill cer-
tain civic obligations such as military service.6 °
Although Soviet constitutional rights are not enforceable against the
state, they do have legitimacy. They are legitimized by implementing
legislation that reflects a particular social or political policy. The scope
of constitutional rights is defined by the policy they are designed to pro-
mote. Religious freedom is given little weight because it runs counter to
the ideological foundation of the political system. On the other hand, the
state strongly supports the right to work and the right to free education
at all levels. These rights are in accord with the basic tenets of Marxism-
Leninism and the requirements of the political system.61
In terms of focus, both the socialist and bourgeois concepts of rights
attempt to promote the general welfare, health, safety, and morals of the
people. Under the socialist concept of rights, however, the state prevails
over the individual because the state deems itself best able to attend to
the needs of its citizens.62
The type of rights conferred and the order in which they appear in
the Soviet Constitution 63 reflect the paternalistic approach of the legal
system. 64 The rights granted first in the chapter on individual freedoms
are not even found in the American Constitution. They include the right
to work, the right to rest and leisure, and the right to free medical care.
These rights reflect the regime's view of the basic requirements for an
(USSR). See infra note 346 and accompanying text (discussing Soviet constitutional rights as
limits on the state).
The approach in the American system is completely different. Under the American Con-
stitution, many rights are inherent and fundamental, and not one is explicitly conditioned on
performance of a duty.
59. Markovits, supra note 23, at 616-17. See infra notes 324-53 and accompanying text.
60. KONST. SSSR arts. 39, 63 (1977) (USSR). See infra notes 278-89 and accompanying
text.
61. Markovits, supra note 23, at 616-17.
62. See H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 366, 378-81 (1963) (discussing paternalism
in Soviet legal system).
63. The section of the Soviet Constitution comparable to the American Bill of Rights is
called, "The State and the Individual." KONST. SSSR § 2 (1977) (USSR). The title of this
section directly links the interests of the individual with the interests of the state.
64. Because of the primacy of the state interest, Harold Berman has characterized the
Soviet legal system as paternalistic. Berman sees the state as parent, teacher, priest, chairper-
son, and business manager. Through the legal system, the state seeks to mold its citizens
according to its ideological dictates to be good children, students, hard workers, and believers
in communism. H. BERMAN, supra note 62, at 366.
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orderly, productive society. These rights precede those rights Americans
think of as fundamental, such as free speech and assembly, freedom of
association, freedom of religion, and inviolability of the person and
home.65
In contrast to the socialist Soviet Constitution, the bourgeois Ameri-
can Constitution restricts state rather than individual conduct. Many of
the constitutional provisions are aimed at curbing state behavior in rela-
tion to the individual. In asserting their constitutional rights, individuals
can override the interests of the state.66 Many provisions in the Ameri-
can Constitution focus more on promoting individual rather than state
interests.67
In bourgeois societies, law serves justice in a way that can undercut
order. Rights take legal precedence, even at the expense of order, effi-
ciency, and progress.68  Bourgeois constitutions protect autonomy,
thereby furthering the individual's well-being frequently at the expense of
the collective well-being. 69 Individual rights are protected and developed
through judicial interpretation of constitutional guarantees. The under-
lying legal values require that individual rights be safeguarded against
65. KoNsT. SSSR arts. 40,41-42, 50, 52, 54-55 (1977) (USSR). The rest of the individual
freedoms peculiar to the Soviet Constitution include the right to old age and disability pensions
(article 43); the right to housing (article 44); the right to free education at all levels (article 45);
and the right to cultural benefits (article 46). Id.
66. Markovits, supra note 23, at 614.
67. Id. Some American constitutional rights, however, are grounded in a rationale that is
not individually-based. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and other
free speech cases, the individual's right to speak is justified by the need for an informed electo-
rate, in order to preserve democracy. This justification promotes the collective good of society.
The hierarchy under the first amendment of highly-protected political speech, lesser pro-
tected commercial speech, and unprotected obscene pornography also demonstrates that
American constitutional rights are based on rationales that serve the social welfare. The law
gives political speech, which serves the general good, more protection than pornography,
which serves the interests of individuals, not society.
68. It would be far less taxing on judicial resources for the Supreme Court to enumerate
rules strictly limiting the exercise of every right in the Constitution. Fewer suits would arise to
test the parameters of constitutional guarantees. The Court has not adopted this approach,
however. In the free speech area, for example, the Court has engaged in intricate line-drawing,
at the expense of judicial economy. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT:
CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 153-60 (4th ed. 1982).
69. Markovits, supra note 23, at 617-19, 621. If protection of individual rights occurs in
the Soviet Union, it is in the economy, where ideology gives way to practical concerns such as
productivity, efficiency, and availability. Markovits contends that the black market could not
function if it were not reinforced by concepts of individual guarantees such as respect for
others' rights and confidence in one's own, acceptance of the binding effect of one's actions,
and individuals' ability to direct their affairs apart from state interference. Markovits, Law
and Order-Constitutionalism and Legality in Eastern Europe, 34 STAN. L. REV. 513, 598
(1982).
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majority rule to ensure a free and just society.70
The socialist and bourgeois legal systems also differ in their textual
definition of rights. Socialist law blurs the contours of constitutional
rights because rights are policy pronouncements rather than entitle-
ments. 71 The law emphasizes the realization of policy rather than the
realization of rights themselves. It is not always clear where rights end
and duties begin; as a result, the state can strike the balance as it sees fit.
The parameters of Soviet rights can be adapted to changing policy.72
Bourgeois law strives for a more precise definition of rights because
rights are entitlements enforceable in court. The scope of rights must be
limited so that courts have guidelines for applying rights in future cases.
These limits also serve to inhibit policy interference from the state.73
Finally, the exercise of constitutional rights differs in socialist and
bourgeois legal systems. In socialist systems, realization of a right is a
public matter. Exercising a right implicates the interests of the collective
and involves society as a whole.74 Violations of Soviet rights undermine
the legitimacy of the government and threaten the entire society.75 Such
violations require a social solution which facilitates the state's indoctrina-
tion process.
In bourgeois systems, exercise of a right is, at least initially, an indi-
vidual concern. Individuals seek vindication of their rights against the
state. The state does not explicitly use trials to impose policy pronounce-
ments on society.7 6
In summary, socialist systems view constitutional rights as the guar-
antor and embodiment of the law, which derives from a communist vi-
sion of society. In bourgeois systems, in contrast, law is the guarantor
and embodiment of constitutional rights which derive from a democratic
vision of society.
70. Markovits, supra note 23, at 617.
71. Id. at 621-22.
72. Id. See infra notes 234, 245 (discussing evolution of Soviet constitutional provisions
on religion, resulting in greater limits on religious freedom).
73. Markovits, supra note 23, at 620.
74. Id. at 623-25.
75. This consequence explains the imposition of criminal sanctions for violations of con-
stitutional rights. See infra notes 177-223 and accompanying text (discussing Soviet breach of
separation of church and state).
76. There are no state-sponsored "show trials" in the United States, in contrast to the
Soviet Union. The American news media highly publicize some controversial trials, however,
which has the effect of making the outcome a kind of policy statement. An example is the
surrogate mother case popularly known as the Baby M case that was tried in early 1987. In re
Baby M., No. FM-2 5314-86E, slip. op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 31, 1987).
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IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIALIST AND
BOURGEOIS LAW APPLIED: SOVIET VERSUS
AMERICAN LAW ON RELIGION
A. Politics and Ideology
The differences between Soviet and American law on religion stem
not so much from the texts of the two constitutions, which are similar,
but from differences in the underlying politics and ideologies of the two
systems.
1. Separation of Powers
While the Soviet political system has an executive, legislative, and
judicial branch, there is no "separation of powers" as in the American
political system.77 The powers of one political branch do not counterbal-
ance the powers of the other two. The state structure is streamlined to
facilitate control of society. Centralization of power permits the state to
impose its restrictions on religious observance.
In theory, the Soviet Constitution is the supreme law of the land, to
which all other laws and branches of the legal system are subordinate. 78
Even in its title, the Constitution is proclaimed to be fundamental law.79
In practice, however, it is inferior.
There is no meaningful judicial review in the Soviet legal system.80
77. 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, SOVIET LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 53-54 (1983). The
Soviet political system has four branches: the courts; the executive, which is headed by the
Council of Ministers (similar to the British Cabinet) and which represents the state bureau-
cracy; the legislature, called the Supreme Soviet; and the Communist Party. The Party has its
own executive and legislative branches (the Politburo and the Secretariat) which are separate
from the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet. Many officials in the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches are Party members and all are selected in elections controlled by top
Party leadership.
In effect, the Communist Party is superimposed on the other branches to prevent a genu-
ine separation of powers. The Soviet separation of powers merely promotes efficiency. It does
not diffuse and thus weaken governmental power. Final political authority in the Soviet Union
rests with the Party apparatus. G. BRESLAUER & S. ROTHMAN, SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCI-
ETY 188, 192-93, 195 (1978); Kearly & Kim, The 1972 Socialist Constitution of North Korea,
11 TEX. INT. L.J. 113, 135 (1976).
78. C. Osakwe, supra note 12, at 40.
79. Article 173 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution proclaims: "The Constitution of the
USSR shall have supreme legal force. All laws and other acts of state bodies shall be promul-
gated on the basis of, and in conformity with it." KONST. SSSR art. 173 (1977) (USSR).
80. Yugoslavia is the only communist country that has a legal system with meaningful
judicial review. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 14, at 322 n.103; Vyshinsky, supra note 38, at
312-22. Yugoslavia is known for its experimental, quasi-capitalist policies in other areas of
government, especially with respect to the economy. See generally D. RUSINow, THE YUGO-
SLAV EXPERIMENT: 1948-1974 (1977).
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Soviet courts hear constitutional cases, but the decisions have no impact
on the other branches of government. Unlike American courts, which
interpret the American Constitution itself and ensure that laws are en-
acted in accordance with it, Soviet courts merely implement legislation
interpreting the Constitution. The power to propound this implementing
legislation rests exclusively with the Supreme Soviet, 8 the highest legis-
lative body in the Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet represents only one
party, the Communist Party. Consequently, basic guarantees in the Con-
stitution can be overridden or severely weakened by legislation reflecting
Party policy.82
The American political system has a separation of powers. The
powers of one branch check the powers of the other branches. This sepa-
ration of powers decentralizes state power and impedes governmental
pursuit of a single ideological objective. In the context of religion, diffu-
sion of state power prevents the state from favoring one faith, or from
inhibiting all religious observance.83
The United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land; it
overrides state constitutions, as well as state and federal laws that violate
it. Under the doctrine of judicial review established in Marbury v.
Madison,84 United States courts have the power to review and strike
down laws they deem violative of the Constitution. In reviewing statutes,
courts ensure that individuals' constitutional rights are upheld. In the
American model, legislation cannot override the Constitution. Courts,
empowered to interpret the Constitution, can override legislation.85
2. Religion Clauses in the Soviet and American Constitutions
The religion clauses in the American Constitution and current So-
viet Constitution guarantee the right to free exercise of religious belief
and the separation of church and state. Differences between the text and
81. Vyshinsky, supra note 38, at 416. Although there is no judicial review in the Soviet
system, courts have the power to resolve moot questions. These rulings are not rendered in
actual litigation but declare the court's position in future cases, and in this sense are even more
far-reaching than judicial review. These decisions are a form of judicial legislation, although
limited in substance (the courts cannot modify existing law) and in scope (the rulings are
restricted to the courts' own jurisdiction). R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 14, at 259 & n.1 (citing
Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1010, 1013
(1974)).
82. 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 77, at 53-54.
83. See infra notes 231-49 and accompanying text (discussing decisions implementing the
establishment and free exercise clauses in the United States Constitution).
84. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
85. Id. at 177-78.
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interpretation of the respective constitutions' religion clauses are due to
ideological and political differences between the two countries.
a. Freedom of Conscience Versus Free Exercise
Article 52, the religion clause in the current Soviet Constitution,
states that "Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience,
that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct
religious worship or atheistic propaganda."86 Soviet freedom of con-
science is the equivalent of American free exercise or freedom of religious
worship. The Soviet concept of freedom of conscience derives, in part,
from Lenin's view that citizens should be free to profess whatever reli-
gion they please or to profess none at all. Article 52 of the 1977 Soviet
Constitution reflects this approach by defining freedom of conscience as
"the right to profess or not to profess any religion.
' 87
The Soviets argue that freedom of conscience confers a broader
guarantee than the American free exercise clause.88 Unlike the first
amendment guarantee in the United States Constitution, the Soviet pro-
vision includes the right not to believe as well as the right to believe.8 9
Indeed, the American Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the
right to be an atheist, and, in this sense, the Soviet Constitution grants a
more expansive and more neutral right.
American law, however, does give an implicit guarantee. In Everson
v. Board of Education,90 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
protects the right of nonbelief. The Court, however, did not explicitly
hold that free exercise includes this right.91 In Torcaso v. Watkins,92 the
86. KONST. SSSR art. 52 (1977) (USSR). Soviet freedom of conscience is not comparable
to what American law calls "freedom of conscience," or conscientious objection. The Ameri-
can concept of freedom of conscience guarantees the right to forego compulsory military ser-
vice because of a religious belief that waging war is anathema. See Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971) (exemption from compulsory military service laws based on religious con-
science). In sharp contrast, Soviet law does not recognize the right to abstain from compul-
sory military service because of religious conviction. Military service is always mandatory in
the Soviet Union. In fact, in the Soviet Union military service is elevated to the status of a
constitutional norm. Article 62 of the 1977 Constitution states that "defense of the Socialist
Motherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR." Article 63 states that "[m]ilitary
service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honorable duty of Soviet citizens."
KONsT. SSSR art. 62, 63 (1977) (USSR).
87. KONST. SSSR art. 52 (1977) (USSR).
88. The American free exercise clause states that "Congress shall make no law... prohib-
iting the free exercise [of religion] .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
89. V. KLOCHKOV, ZAKON I RELIGIIA (Law and Religion) 3 (1982).
90. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
91. Id. at 15-16. The Court held that under the establishment clause the state cannot
coerce religious observance or belief. In Everson, a taxpayer had challenged the validity of a
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Court specifically held that free exercise includes the right of nonbelief.9 3
While article 52 guarantees the right to conduct atheistic propa-
ganda, it does not confer a companion right to proselytize. With respect
to proselytizing, Soviet free exercise is much more limited than its Amer-
ican counterpart.94 This asymmetry stems from the assumption that reli-
gious beliefs and the propagation of those beliefs are always separable.95
To the Soviets, religious belief is less of a threat to the state than propa-
gation of religious belief.
The concern with propagation makes sense in the context of Soviet
ideology and policy pronouncements. Soviet law promotes the state's in-
terests. Guaranteeing the right to religious belief merely preserves the
status quo. Guaranteeing the right to proselytize threatens state control
and undermines the legitimacy of a government which claims to have
eliminated the need for religion.
Article 52 also provides that "[i]ncitement of hostility or hatred on
religious grounds is prohibited."96 This provision seems to strengthen
the freedom of conscience guarantees. 97 On the other hand, the clause
also weakens freedom of conscience because it bars the use of religious
dogma to provoke resistance to state policies.98
The first amendment of the United States Constitution incorporates
the American concept of free exercise. The first amendment provides
that "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of
New Jersey statute and board of education resolution permitting reimbursement to parents for
the cost of transporting their children to public and sectarian schools. The Court held that the
statute and resolution did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. Id. at
17-18. The Court reasoned that the legislation did not exclusively support sectarian schools.
Rather, the legislation and resolution provided a nonsectarian program to help parents trans-
port their children to school. Id.
92. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
93. Id. at 496. In Watkins, the Court invalidated a statute requiring notary public ap-
pointees to profess belief in God as a prerequisite to receiving their commission. See also the
religious accommodation clause of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
(1983) (containing neutral provisions entitling all employees, whether believers or atheists, to
reasonable accommodation of their religious beliefs).
94. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (discussing scope of American freedom
of religious conduct).
95. Article 52 guarantees the right to believe, the right to worship, and the right to propa-
gate atheism, but not the right to propagate religious belief. The underlying presumption of
this provision is that a person can remain true to any religious faith without having the right to
proselytize. KoNST. SSSR art. 52 (1977) (USSR).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. A. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR 197-98 (1981); Hecht,
supra note 29, at 20-21. The state can interpret a ban on incitement of hostility on religious
grounds to prevent religious leaders from delivering sermons against the state.
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religion]... .,99 The free exercise clause guarantees the right to believe
in and worship any religion, as well as the right to proselytize. I°° The
values of pluralism and individuality, basic to American democratic
political theory, provide the basis for the first amendment's guarantee of
religious diversity.
Cases interpreting the free exercise clause reflect the wide latitude of
religious freedom in American society. The United States Supreme
Court has held that freedom of religion includes the right to forego
otherwise compulsory activity which conflicts with religious convic-
tion.101 The California Supreme Court has upheld the right to use peyote
in religious services. 0
In theory, the free exercise clause limits government interference
with religion. In practice, however, the state can limit religious freedom
if the state advances a sufficiently strong countervailing interest.
Although American religious rights are entitlements, they are not abso-
lute barriers to state infringement.10 3
b. Separation of Church and State: The Soviet Versus the
American Version
Article 52 also ensures that "the church in the USSR shall be sepa-
rated from the state, and the school from the church."" °  This provision
is the Soviet counterpart of the American establishment clause, which
provides for separation of church and state under American law. The
Soviets claim that this clause in article 52 guarantees complete separation
of church and state. 5
Despite this claim, the Soviet government plays an active role in
religious affairs. The state's persecution of religious believers and activ-
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
101. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (exempting Amish children from compulsory attendance in high school).
102. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (permit-
ting use of peyote in religious ceremonies of Native American Church); see also McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (free exercise ensures freedom to engage in religious activities);
Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (free exercise
guarantees right to proselytize); but see Note, Soul Rebels: The Rastafarians and the Free
Exercise Clause, 72 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1605 (1984) (citing only reported case on whether Ras-
tafarianism, whose adherents must smoke liberal amounts of marijuana, merits protection as a
religion under first amendment; court suggested movement did not deserve protection).
103. See infra notes 300-43 and accompanying text (discussing rights as limits on state).
104. KONST. SSSR art. 52 (1977) (USSR).
105. I. CHAFAREVITCH, LA LEGISLATION SUR LA RELIGION EN URSS (Law on Religion
in the USSR) 77 (1974).
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
ists and its pervasive antireligion campaign in the schools and in society
violate the principle of separation of church and state. The propaganda
and the legislation which implements article 52106 reveal the state's bias
against religion.
The first amendment of the United States Constitution enumerates
the American principle of separation of church and state. The amend-
ment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion.... " 7 This provision, known as the "establishment clause,"
prevents the federal and state governments10 8 from enacting legislation
that favors or discriminates against religion.109 The language of the es-
tablishment clause reflects Thomas Jefferson's belief that the church
should be walled off from the state to shield secular interests, both public
and private, from religious interference. It also incorporates James
Madison's view that separating the church from the state would best ad-
vance both religious and secular interests, by ensuring competition
among sects rather than dominance by any one. 10
As in the Soviet Union, the wall between church and state in the
United States is not impenetrable. In certain circumstances, ensuring
free exercise means violating the establishment clause.'1 ' Conversely,
preventing the establishment of religion can restrict religious freedom. 112
In addition, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the establishment
clause is biased towards activies which encourage rather than discourage
religious belief.' 13
3. The Impact of Ideological Attitude Toward Religion on
Separation of Church and State
Both the Soviet Union and the United States aspire to separation of
church and state, and they do so for the same reason. Religion had an
106. See infra notes 134-82 and accompanying text (discussing Decree on Religious
Associations).
107. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
108. The Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment incorporates the first
amendment. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
109. The first amendment's two clauses are mutually reinforcing; insuring state neutrality
towards religion insulates the church from the state and, thus, helps strengthen the freedom of
religion guaranteed by the free exercise clause.
110. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816 (1978).
111. See infra notes 279-85 and accompanying text (discussing court cases accommodating
religious beliefs).
112. See infra notes 315-41 and accompanying text (discussing accommodation principle
and freedom of religious worship under American constitutional law).
113. See infra notes 250-85 and accompanying text (discussing American case law on the
establishment clause).
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oppressive influence in the autocracy overthrown by the Bolsheviks '14
and in the governments abandoned by the pilgrims when they came to
North America."1 5 The two countries seek different goals, however, in
promoting the separation. The United States attempts to ensure govern-
ment neutrality toward religion and to maintain plurality of religious be-
lief as part of its democratic ideology. 16 The Soviet Union strives to
advance its atheistic policies and eradicate religion, in accordance with
Marxism-Leninism.
In promoting these goals, both countries violate the principle of sep-
aration of church and state. In the United States, the bias is towards
religion. The state intervenes to favor religion and advance the right to
believe. In the Soviet Union, the bias is towards the state. The state
intervenes to restrict religious conduct whenever it conflicts with the
state's policies. 117
5. The Soviet Context
The ideology and political system underlying Soviet law help ex-
plain the violation of the separation principle. Marxism-Leninism con-
demns religious belief and advocates weakening its influence in society." 
8
If law is subordinate to Party ideology and the state," 9 official policy
may promote atheism without violating the Constitution.
In addition, many religious values, such as individualism and per-
sonal salvation, conflict with the Soviet emphasis on the state and the
needs of the collective. 120 The government justifies favoring itself, in
conferring individual freedoms and in striking the balance between
church and state, on the ground that the state can best determine the
needs of its citizens. 121 The Soviets argue that state involvement in the
church constitutes an administrative necessity.' 22 Even if state action
were seen as interference, the Soviets would argue that the needs of the
individual are subordinate to the needs of the state. Soviet individual
114. V. KUROYEDOV, supra note 34, at 7-9.
115. See, e.g., I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE ORIGIN AND MEANING 29-30 (1965);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947).
116. See infra notes 231-48 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
120. See THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTATION AND HISTORI-
CAL COMMENTARY 155 (J. Hazard, P. Maggs & I. Shapiro eds. 1969) [hereinafter SOVIET
LEGAL SYSTEM].
121. H. BERMAN, supra note 62, at 366.
122. G. GOL'ST, supra note 32, at 29-32.
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rights are correlative; the state can grant and guarantee them as it sees
fit. 123
Lenin and contemporary Soviet theorists have acknowledged that
they cannot eliminate religion with prohibitions. Lenin counseled
against "offending" the sensibilities of believers. He advocated waging
the struggle against "religious prejudices" through propaganda and sci-
entific instruction. Absolute prohibitions not only make an unfavorable
impression on the outside world, they also foment resistance and inten-
sify religious belief. Therefore, although the government condemns reli-
gion, it feels compelled, in the interests of political expediency, to give
religion limited legal legitimacy. 124
Excessive antireligious pressure applied by the state might provoke
an underground movement that would be harder to control than religion
itself. Consequently, the Soviet government has struck a balance. It al-
lows religious observance but restricts it in a manner that permits surveil-
lance. 125 Lastly, the Soviet government imposes administrative, civil,
and criminal sanctions to ensure conformance with state goals. 126
In this sense, Soviet law is not so much against religion as it is
against religion as a source of political power. It is directed not against
religion per se, but rather, against the possibility that religious organiza-
tions will become independent power centers. 127 Powerful religions are
an anathema in a totalitarian state like the Soviet Union.
The government's hostility toward religion has manifested itself in
the promulgation of restrictive statutes. On January 23, 1918, three
months after the Revolution, Lenin issued a decree entitled, "On the Sep-
aration of the Church From the State."'' 28 The decree was founded on
Lenin's official policy that religious groups should not be linked with the
state. 129 Its actual purpose, however, was to undercut the church's
strong influence in politics and the schools.
The provisions of the decree disenfranchised the church. Under the
123. See infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
124. Anashkin, Freedom of Conscience and Observance of the Laws on Religious Denomina-
tions, 4 SOVIET LAW & GOV'T 20, 20-21, 23 (1965).
125. See generally infra notes 134-82 and accompanying text (discussing Decree on Reli-
gious Associations.
126. 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 77, at 249.
127. Id. The Soviets' concern about their Muslim population serves as an example. As
early as December 1917, the state recognized the need to placate the Muslims. In that year,
the government issued a directive expediting the transfer of the Sacred Koran of Osman from
the State Public Library to the Regional Mussulman Congress. Vyshinsky, supra note 38, at
606-08.
128. 2 V. GsovsKi, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 329 (1948).
129. Vyshinsky, supra note 38, at 606-07.
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decree, any civil records kept by ecclesiastical authorities were trans-
ferred to civil authorities.13 More importantly, religious organizations
lost their juristic personality and the right to possess property. All
church property was nationalized. The church became a private society
with no grants or benefits from the state.1 3
1
Lenin recognized that the school is a key state tool for political and
social indoctrination. His intention was to cripple the church more than
to ensure religious freedom. Consequently, the decree protects the state
and the schools from interference by the church.1 32 The decree does not
protect the church from interference by the state. On the contrary,
under Soviet law, churches are completely under state control. 133
The "Decree on Religious Associations" constitutes a severe in-
fringement of the separation of church and state principle and an even
greater limitation on religious freedom.1 34 It is the chief piece of legisla-
tion regulating religion in the Soviet Union.135 Under the decree, the
state regulates religions as if they were administrative agencies.
First, the law requires all religious groups1 36 to register with the
government.1 37  Unlike social organizations, religious groups cannot
130. Id. at 608.
131. Id.
132. 2 V. GsOVSKI, supra note 128, at 145-46.
133. 2 V. GsOVSKI, supra note 128, at 329; E. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE So-
VIET LEGAL SYSTEM 99-100 (1969). This imbalance, allowing the state to interfere with the
church, but not the church with the state, parallels (in reverse) the American position embod-
ied in the establishment clause. The establishment clause controls state activities affecting
individuals' religious rights, not individuals' activities that may impact on religious freedoms,
even when these activities superimpose religion on the political process. Thus, the American
provision insulates the individual from religious interference by the state, but not the state
from interference by the individual. See infra notes 344-45 and accompanying text (discussing
area of protection potentially broader in Soviet system than in American system).
134. See infra notes 136-82 and accompanying text. This decree, issued by the Supreme
Soviet of the RSFSR on April 8, 1929 and amended on January 1, 1932 and June 23, 1975, is
still in force. Hecht, supra note 29, at 212; Decree on Religious Associations, VED. VERKH.
Soy. RSFSR (Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) [hereinafter Decree on Religious
Associations] reprinted in THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: SELECTED CONTEMPORARY LEGIS-
LATION AND DOCUMENTS 381 (,V. Butler trans. 1978) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY LEGIS-
LATION AND DOCUMENTS]; 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 105 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]. Some authors assert that uncertainty exists as to whether the
decree is still in effect, because some, but not all, of its provisions were accepted in the 1966
amendments to article 142 of the RSFSR (CRIMINAL CODE). These authors suggest that the
uncertainty is deliberate since it makes it harder to assert rights under the decree.
135. Hecht, supra note 29, at 212. The decree has never been openly published in any
journal or newspaper, and has always been extremely difficult to obtain. Id.
136. Religious groups are defined as "associations of believing citizens of all cults." Decree
on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 2.
137. Id. Mandatory explicit consent allows the government to monitor with precision indi-
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function legally until they have received approval from the Council for
Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers.13 8
The approval process is labyrinthine. All members of the group
must sign a petition which is sent to the executive committee of the dis-
trict or city soviet (council) of working people's deputies. This group
forwards the petition to a council of ministers of an autonomous republic
or to an executive committee of territory, regional, and city soviets. This
higher authority must recommend the petition to the Council for Reli-
gious Affairs, a national executive body. 139 Even if the religious group
complies with the law, the Council can arbitrarily refuse registration of
any religious society" or can deny registration on the pretext that the
sect preaches counterrevolutionary, fanatical dogma."'4 Besides present-
ing almost insurmountable bureaucratic obstacles, the registration re-
quirement forces many religions to operate illegally. 42 For example,
Jehovah's Witnesses refuse to make the required testimonials, including
the signed consent mandated for registration. 14 3
The decree also debilitates religion by dismembering it. Under the
decree, organized religion is changed from an aggregation of parishes or
congregations into a series of disconnected, localized units. 1" An indi-
vidual cannot belong to more than one religious association, 45 and there
must be at least twenty people in a religious group at all times. 146 Any
change in membership or leadership must be reported to the authorities
within seven days.'4 7 Members must be at least eighteen years old. 48
vidual participation in religious activities. The registration of religious groups requirement
also discourages membership since it brands the registrants as non-conformists and facilitates
official reprisals, such as KGB harassment, demotion or loss of employment. Hecht, supra
note 29, at 209-10.
138. See Vyshinsky, supra note 38, at 609. A rough parallel to this official recognition
requirement exists in the United States, where courts, not the legislature, have refused to rec-
ognize certain religious groups as legal entities. For example, in Robinson v. Foti, 527 F.
Supp. 1111, 1113 (E.D. La. 1981) the district court suggested that Rastafarianism does not
merit first amendment protection. A court's refusal to give legal recognition to certain reli-
gious groups is less intrusive than the Soviet law, however.
139. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, §§ 4, 5.
140. Id.; I. CHAFAREVITCH, supra note 105, at 15.
141. 1961 Instruction to the Decree on Religious Associations, § 23; I. CHAFAREVITCH,
supra note 105, at 15.
142. Hecht, supra note 29, at 209. Religious groups that are not legally registered must go
underground. Their members may face KGB harassment, loss of employment and criminal
penalties. Id.
143. J. HAZARD, MANAGING CHANGE IN THE USSR 73, 75 (1982).
144. Gsovski, Legal Status of the Church in Soviet Russia, 8 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 8 (1939).
145. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 2.
146. Id. § 3.
147. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 17.
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Furthermore, only people in the same city or its vicinity, or in the same
village or several small villages of a ralon (district) can form a religious
association. 49 Each group can use only one building for worship.' 50
The decree strictly delineates the status and prerogatives of religious
associations. Religious groups are much more regulated than secular or-
ganizations that have official approval. Like the decree on separation of
church and state, 5 the Decree on Religious Associations strips religious
groups of their juridical personality.152 Religious associations cannot
own real or personal property, even if the property has been devised or
bequeathed to the association.'5 3 They can, however, keep or acquire
implements necessary for worship. 4 If the implement is of historical or
artistic value, local authorities can confiscate it for museum displays.' 5
Religious groups can procure transportation and construct or
purchase prayer buildings, 56 but only with the approval of a state super-
visory board for church affairs. 157 Religious associations must contract
with the state to use buildings for services; such contracts are accepted by
the state only if the arrangement furthers religious worship. 5 8 Religious
groups cannot enter into commercial contracts, such as leasing a printing
company to publish prayer books,159 nor can they engage in any other
form of economic activity, including production or manufacture of non-
religious goods.160
Once a contract with the state has been consummated, the religious
group can use the building free of charge. 6 The group has other finan-
cial obligations, however. In cities, the association must pay taxes on the
land occupied by the building, and, in all locations, associations must pay
taxes on the building itself. 62 Individual members of the religious asso-
148. Id. § 3. Although children cannot belong to religious groups, they can attend services
with their parents. V. KUROYEDOV, supra note 34, at 14 (1979).
149. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 8.
150. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 10.
151. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
152. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 3.
153. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 134, at
106.
154. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 3.
155. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 10-11.
156. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 3.
157. Id. § 45; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 134, at 106.
158. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 10.
159. Id. § 11.
160. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 134, at 106.
161. Id.; Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 10.
162. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 12. In the United States religious groups are not liable for
taxes on church property, because they are nonprofit organizations. In Walz v. Tax Commis-
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ciation are responsible for the taxes, since the association itself is not a
corporate or juridical entity.163 In addition, religious groups can pay
taxes only from members' donations. Mandatory dues cannot be col-
lected because compulsory collection of money by religious associations
is illegal. 1" The taxes do not merely cripple religious groups; they dis-
integrate them. After taxes are paid, little remains for the maintenance
of religious implements and the clergy, who, unlike all other Soviet work-
ers, are not paid by the state. 16
5
Finally, prayer houses must be insured at the expense of the congre-
gation. The beneficiary of the insurance is the local soviet, the owner of
the building. If the building is damaged or destroyed, the insurance pro-
ceeds are used to reconstruct it only if rebuilding is permitted. Recon-
struction must be authorized by the Council on Religious Affairs which
may prefer to allocate the money to other community or cultural
needs. 166
The Decree on Religious Associations severely circumscribes activi-
ties of religious groups. Their only substantial right is "to practice their
cult," that is, to hold religious services and perform religious rites.167
Only services conducted in authorized prayer buildings are free from
state interference. Notice to the authorities is required for conducting
services in buildings "that are not specially adapted"16 for that purpose.
This provision effectively bars secret gatherings. According to the con-
tract for use of the building, the association must admit the local authori-
ties at any time unless religious rites are being performed. 169
General meetings other than services, open-air meetings, and reli-
gious festivals and processions require notice and a special permit from
the district executive committee or city soviet. 170 These requirements
may be waived, however, for festivals that are an integral part of services
performed around a religious building, or if the festivals do not disturb
sion, 397 U.S. 664, 673-78 (1970), the Court sustained a tax exemption for nonprofit church
property on establishment clause grounds. The Court reasoned that allowing taxation would
give the government leverage over religious institutions and would increase state interference
in religious affairs.
163. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 12. Religious Associations cannot own property or as-
sume financial liability. Id. at 10, 12.
164. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 54.
165. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 12-13.
166. J. HAZARD, supra note 143, at 75.
167. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 135, at 106.
168. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 57.
169. Id. § 29(f). Even when services are being conducted, there is no prohibition on covert
state interference. Undercover KGB agents may be present at any time.
170. Id. §§ 12, 59.
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street traffic.1 71
Religious associations cannot perform any charitable work or give
material aid to their members.1 72 In addition, religious associations can-
not organize groups for children, adults, religious or literary study, or
handicraft, nor can religious associations sponsor retreats and trips.
They cannot open playgrounds, libraries, sanatoria, or hospitals. Only
those books which are necessary for worship may be kept by the
group. 173 Religious teaching in educational institutions is forbidden.
Some religious instruction is permitted in ecclesiastical schools estab-
lished under the law.'74
Members of the clergy are restricted in the activities they may un-
dertake. They may only manage and use the property necessary for the
performance of religious ceremonies and lead their congregation in reli-
gious worship. The jurisdiction of the clergy is limited to their own lo-
cality. They cannot officially represent their congregation or sect at a
convention, in a committee, or in a public body,175 nor can they engage
in political or social organizational activity. 76 Moreover, all members of
the clergy must answer a state questionnaire and be licensed before they
can officiate. The state can revoke the license at any time. 177
No religious ceremonies or symbols are permitted in state institu-
tions, including factories and cultural or recreation centers. Officially,
religious rites may be performed without notice in homes and at ceme-
teries and crematoria.' 7s The law also permits baptisms to be conducted
171. Id. § 60. Christmas and Easter, along with other religious festivals, are not state holi-
days. Failure to appear at work for a single working day constitutes grounds for dismissal
under the Soviet Labor Code. Consequently, observance of even a major religious holiday may
result in the loss of one's job. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 20.
172. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 17(a), (b). Soviets rationalize this
ban on providing charity by claiming (a) that such activity is not directly related to religious
worship and (b) that there is no practical need for it. Prior to Gorbachev, the Soviet leadership
claimed that the Communist regime had abolished poverty, hunger, and unemployment, which
are endemic only to capitalist societies. V. KUROYEDOV, supra note 34, at 15; A.
BARMENKOV, supra note 25, at 64.
The USSR has not eradicated these ills. See Bohlen, Soviet Media, in Switch, Report on
Dark Side of Life, Washington Post, April 4, 1987, at A13-14, col. 1. A more truthful reason
for the prohibition on providing charity lies in the Soviet claim that the state has sole responsi-
bility for the welfare of the people. Any competing provider undercuts this assertion and the
legitimacy of the regime.
173. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 17(c).
174. Id. § 18.
175. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 18.
176. I. CHAFAREVITCH, supra note 105, at 98.
177. E. JOHNSON, supra note 133, at 100.
178. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 58; I. CHAFAREVITCH, supra note
105, at 89.
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in the home without prior approval. 179
In practice, however, the clergy must have official authorization to
visit homes or to perform rites at a cemetery or crematorium, and such
authorization is rarely given.18° In addition, prayer is prohibited in the
common areas of communal apartments unless all residents agree to per-
mit it.18 1 Finally, parents can give religious instruction only to their own
children. The state, however, strongly discourages the exercise of this
limited prerogative. 8 2
There is an administrative structure for organized religion independ-
ent of the religious associations themselves. This structure facilitates
state control. The different sects convene congresses to elect representa-
tives to administrative bodies.' 83 Associations must, however, receive
179. I.CHAFAREVITCH, supra note 105, at 89.
180. Id. at 90-91.
181. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 19.
182. I. CHAFAREVITCH, supra note 105, at 83. Although parents officially have the right to
provide religious instruction to their own children, they risk violating national legislation in
exercising this privilege. The state has argued that religious instruction is incompatible with
communism's atheistic values and scientific world view. Accordingly, parents are said to have
a duty to inculcate their children in communist values and a duty not to inculcate their chil-
dren in religious values. Hecht, supra note 29, at 199-200. The general provisions of Soviet
legislation on marriage and the family state that one of the law's major tasks is:
further strengthening of the Soviet family based on principles of common morality
... [and] the bringing up of children of the family in an organic combination with
social nurturing in a spirit of devotion to the Motherland, of a communist attitude
toward labor, and of training children to actively participate in the construction of a
communist society.
Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the USSR and Union Republic on Marriage and the
Family, art. 1 (1968) [hereinafter Legislation on Marriage and the Family], reprinted in CON-
TEMPORARY LEGISLATION AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 134, at 451.
The Soviet law on marriage and the family also provides that "parents shall be obliged to
nurture their children, be concerned for their physical development and learning, prepare them
for socially useful labor, and raise worthy members of socialist society." Legislation on Mar-
riage and the Family, supra, art. 18.
According to one source, Khrushchev imposed a ban on parents giving religious instruc-
tion even to their children in secret legislation enacted on December 19, 1962. This right was
not restored by the 1975 amendment to the decree on religious associations. Boiter, supra note
30, at 61, (citing ZAKONODATEL'STVO o RELIGIOZNYKH KULTAKH (Laws on Religious
Cults) 88 n.83 (V. Kuroyedov & A. Pankratov eds. 1971)).
Soviet restrictions on giving religious instruction to children contrast sharply with the
American freedom to educate one's children as one chooses. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
183. A. BARMENKOV, supra note 25, at 67-69. All major denominations have a religious
center. The Russian Orthodox Church, for instance, is represented by the Patriarch of Mos-
cow and All Russia, and by the Holy Synod, a collective body that functions under the Patri-
arch. Id.
It should be noted that there are four independent religious centers for Muslims located in
different regions of the country. Id. This diffusion of Muslim administrative control demon-
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authorization for every congress from the Council for Religious Af-
fairs. '84 Petitions must include the time, place, number of delegates, a
list of topics for discussion, and a list of the demands and inquiries to be
addressed to the representatives. 8 ' The local authorities can reject any
candidate or remove any representative from office without cause.1
86
The Decree on Religious Associations is administered by a central-
ized state agency, the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council
of Ministers, and its local committees and commissions. 18 7 The function
of these local authorities is described in a decree unpublished in the So-
viet Union. They monitor the activity of religious associations in their
district, report on infringements of the law, and submit suggestions for
restricting and weakening religious activity within the framework of the
law. These committees and commissions report which people participate
in private religious rituals (baptisms, weddings, and funerals) and which
are active members of religious associations. They also ensure that reli-
gious assocations' tax and registration obligations are met.188
State authorities can arbitrarily intervene in religious affairs.'8 9 The
decree itself permits the Council for Religious Affairs, acting on the rec-
ommendation of local officials, to curtail use of a building for worship if
the Council determines that the building is needed for "state or social
needs." 190 This phrase can be interpreted to include almost anything.
Consequently, prayer buildings can be closed on a pretext.' 9'
More fundamentally, registration permits may be revoked with no
explanation if: (a) membership drops below twenty; (b) the group's ac-
tivities deviate from its established norms (another vague phrase); or (c)
the group violates any provision of the law on religious associations or
breaches the group's agreement with the state for use of the prayer build-
strates the regime's wariness of the growing Muslim population. See supra notes 124-27 and
accompanying text.
184. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 20.
185. I. CHAFAREVITCH, supra note 105, at 59-60.
186. Id. at 16-17 (citing 1961 Instruction to the Decree on Religious Associations § 13).
187. Id. at 59-60. These local agents include executive committees (ispolkom) of the re-
gional or district soviets and, since 1963, Social Commissions for the Control of the Obser-
vance of Religious Legislation. Id.
188. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 134, at 107.
189. Id. at 108.
190. Decree on Religious Associations, supra note 134, § 36.
191. If a prayer building requires repair, the authorities can close it until renovation is
completed, which could take years. Id. § 50. If the religious group refuses to or cannot make
the repairs, the contract for use of the building is subject to dissolution. Id. § 51. If the build-
ing is on the verge of collapse or requires demolition, the contract is automatically terminated.
Id. § 52.
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ing. 92 The members of the association cannot protest, rebut, or appeal
the revocation, just as they cannot contest denial of the permit.'93
In addition to restricting religious activity, Soviet implementing leg-
islation on religion inflicts punishment for engaging in certain types of
religious conduct. The 1966 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the RSFSR imposes administrative penalties for the following
violations: (1) deviation from the registration requirement; (2) illegal op-
eration of a religious association (for example, conducting services in an
unapproved house of worship or in a government building); and (3) or-
ganizing special programs for children and young people or literary cir-
cles and workers' groups. 194  Violators are fined fifty rubles. 195  In
addition, article 19 of the Code on Marriage and the Family subjects
parents to civil liability for providing religious instruction to their chil-
dren. As a penalty, the state deprives one or both parents of custody.'9 6
Article 227 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which is representative of
all the republics' criminal codes, is the most severe. 197 Under this stat-
ute, it is illegal to use religion as a pretext for organizing or conducting
activities that: (a) cause harm to the health of citizens; 198 (b) infringe
their rights; (c) encourage minors to join a religious group; or (d) induce
shirking of a required social activity or civic duty, or abstinence from an
optional recreational activity. 199 The authorities can interpret almost
any conduct as a violation of this provision. Article 227, therefore, can
be an instrument of religious repression." For example, the authorities
192. I. CHAFAREVITCH, supra note 105, at 28-29 (citing 1931 Instruction to the Decree on
Religious Associations §§ 24, 32, 34); G. GOL'ST, supra note 32, at 41; Decree on Religious
Associations, supra note 134, § 43.
193. Id.
194. G. GOL'ST, supra note 32, at 79, 81 (citing Ved. Verkh. Soy. RSFSR (Bulletin of the
Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR), No. 12, at 24 (1966)).
195. Id. According to the official exchange rate, quoted by Riggs National Bank in Wash-
ington, D.C., one ruble equals approximately $1.57. On the black market, however, one ruble
may be worth as little as one-third of one dollar. Deak International, a foreign exchange firm
in Washington, D.C., quoted the free market rate as $.365 to one ruble.
196. Legislation on Marriage and the Family, supra note 182, art. 19.
197. The current Soviet Constitution effectively leaves codification of criminal law to the
individual republics. SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 19.
198. Unlike articles 142 and 143, which have no counterpart in American law, article 227's
ban on religious activity injurious to citizens' health has a rough equivalent in the American
system. Under American case law, certain conduct associated with religion is criminal, such
as bigamy and polygamy, and the use of snakes in church services. See infra notes 302-07 and
accompanying text (discussing limitations on free exercise under American law).
199. SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 120, at 81.
200. The ban on activity injurious to citizens' health is especially subject to this construc-
tion. I. CHAFAREVITCH, supra note 105, at 50-51. The official commentary on article 227
interprets injury to persons as physical or mental damage due to "religious hysteria," self-
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have relied on it to persecute docile worshipers on the ground that hours
of standing and praying in buildings without adequate ventilation alleg-
edly endangers their health.20 1
Moreover, officials may view preaching that merely affects the atti-
tude of adherents as a threat to their well-being. The Alma-Ata case
presents an example of this interpretation of article 227.202 In Alma-Ata,
the state prosecuted members of the Evangelical Baptist Society and a
religious group called the Initiators for advocating repeal of the laws on
religion and for unrestricted proselytizing. The state argued that the
groups' leaders had confused and poisoned childrens' minds and cor-
rupted their souls.
The court found the accused guilty of "forcibly" teaching the chil-
dren the Gospel.20 3 It held that the children were deprived of their rights
as citizens, including the right not to believe. The Alma-Ata case dem-
onstrates that preaching, which the state sees as a threat to its legitimacy,
violates the Soviet Constitution. 2" Thus, the government can justify re-
stricting religious conduct it deems threatening on the ground that the
conduct weakens the state's ability to safeguard individual rights.
Article 227's prohibitions against infringing citizens' rights and
against discouraging participation in certain activities outlaw religious
groups which keep children out of school on Saturdays to go to church;
which prevent children from going to movies, watching television, or
reading fiction; and which have members who refuse to vote in the elec-
tions, serve in the army, or participate in the census.20 5 Organizing activ-
ities banned by article 227 is punishable by deprivation of freedom for up
to five years or exile. The offender's personal property may also be con-
mortification, slander, insults, illegal imprisonment, threats, perverted conduct, and rape.
PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 35, at 38.
Originally article 227 may have been aimed at fanatic religious sects, such as the skoptsy
or eunuchs, who practiced self-castration, the khlisty or whippers, who practiced flagellation of
themselves and others, and the Religious Pentacostals, who believe in extreme mysticism and
denial of the material world. This group induces visions, delivers bizarre prophesies, and con-
ducts long fasts and exhausting prayer sessions. E. JOHNSON, supra note 133, at 102. Article
227 may also have been directed at sects which refuse all treatment by physicians or which
proscribe certain types of treatment such as blood transfusions. Id. at 102.
201. E. JOHNSON, supra note 133, at 102.
202. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
203. Vorotynova, supra note 4.
204. J. HAZARD, supra note 143, at 76-78.
205. A. BARMENKOV, supra note 25, at 71, 115-16. These same provisions prevent reli-
gious groups from advising parents to keep their children out of the Pioneers and the Kom-
somol (Communist Youth League). The Pioneers is a children's group and the Komsomol is a
teenager's group. Both are sponsored by the Party. They preach militant atheism, among
other communist values. PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 35, at 38.
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fiscated.2 °6 Active participation in proscribed activities is punishable by
deprivation of liberty or exile for up to three years or by corrective la-
bor2°7 for up to one year.2"' If neither the participants nor their acts
present a great danger to society, the authorities may only apply social
pressure against them.20 9
At first glance, this provision seems to mitigate the harshness of the
statute. Officials, however, could still construe the statute broadly.
"Great danger to society" could be interpreted to include the signing of a
petition protesting religious persecution. Moreover, the social censure2 10
imposed under the mitigating provision could ruin a career, and result in
termination of employment. Because there is no official unemployment
in the Soviet Union, punished individuals will receive some kind of job,
but their new position is usually demeaning. College professors, for ex-
ample, might have to work as elevator operators.211
Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code also reinforces the atheistic
policies underlying Soviet laws on religion. Article 70 prohibits anti-So-
viet agitation, which the provision defines as propaganda directed at sub-
verting Soviet authority or facilitating the commission of crimes against
the state.212 Crimes against the state can include conduct which chal-
lenges the authority of the Soviet government or which criticizes the eco-
nomic, political, or cultural accomplishments of the proletarian
revolution.213 Violators can be exiled for two to five years or imprisoned
in a labor camp for six months to seven years.214
The KGB is probably the most potent threat to religious activists
because it functions outside the judicial system. The KGB is not subject
206. RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE art. 227. Generally, deprivation of freedom (imprisonment)
is limited to 10 years except in cases of dangerous recidivism or very serious crimes, both of
which have 15 year terms. Convicts are assigned to corrective labor in a camp or prison under
harsh conditions. Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Union Repub-
lics, art. 23 (1958) [hereinafter Criminal Legislation] reprinted in SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM,
supra note 182, at 661; RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE art. 24.
207. Corrective labor does not involve imprisonment. Corrective labor requires assignment
to a project at the convicts' work place or near their residence for a fixed period of up to one
year. During this term, a portion of the convicts' salary, ranging from five to twenty percent,
is deducted for the benefit of the state. Criminal Legislation, art. 25; RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE
art. 27.
208. E. JOHNSON, supra note 133, at 102.
209. Id.
210. See infra note 230 (defining sanction of social censure).
211. J. RICHELSON, SWORD AND SHIELD: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY APPA-
RATUS 257 (1986)
212. RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE art. 70.
213. See, e.g., SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 81-83.
214. RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE art. 70.
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to any legal restraint.2 15 The procedures followed by the KGB need not
conform to the Soviet Constitution. For the KGB, the Constitution is
not the supreme law of the land, but merely a declaration of general
policies and a delineation of an administrative scheme.2 16
Nevertheless, Soviet law gives some protection to believers against
infringement of their rights. Local officials may be subject to disciplinary
action for failing to fulfill their duties. Liability can be imposed for mi-
nor infringements of the rights of religious believers and leaders, such as
bureaucratic sluggishness in reviewing complaints about violations of the
law on religion. Infractions are punishable by official reprimand.2 17 This
sanction is weak, however, and probably has little deterrent effect.
Article 142 of the RSFSR Criminal Code is an important part of the
statutory scheme that enforces Soviet law on religion. Article 142 im-
poses liability for violating the separation of church and state. Several
infractions that were formerly separate criminal offenses now fall under
article 142. They include: (1) reporting false information on a registra-
tion statement for a religious group;218 (2) treating a religious group or
seeking to have a religious group treated as a juridical entity;21 9 (3) com-
pulsory collection of dues or taxes by a religious group under threat of
expulsion; 2  and (4) conducting religious classes for children other than
one's own.
22 1
According to a 1966 edict of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR con-
215. See Gsovski, supra note 144, at 26 (discussing N.K.V.D., precursor of KGB). KGB
harassment of religious activists includes unauthorized searches of their homes, interrogations
at odd hours in unfamiliar surroundings, demotions or terminations without cause, and with-
drawal of key benefits such as government permits to live in a major city. See J. RICHELSON,
supra note 211, at 247-48, 255-58.
216. 1 GOVERNMENT, LAW, AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
24 (K. Grzybowski & V. Gsovski eds. 1959).
217. G. GOL'ST, supra note 32, at 85-86.
218. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 8 n.36 (citing N. ORLEANSKI, THE LAW CONCERNING
RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN THE RSFSR 27 (1930)).
219. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 14.
220. Id. at 13. This prohibition stems from the state's refusal to allow any other organiza-
tions, especially religious groups, to act in a governmental capacity. No organization besides
the state can have administrative independence or anything approaching the power to tax. G.
GoL'sT, supra note 32, at 36.
221. Gsovski, supra note 144, at 19 n.97. Other article 142 violations include: (1) failure of
a religious group to keep accurate records of property leased from the state including the
prayer building and religious implements, G. ZHELEZNOGORSKII, supra note 25, at 74; (2)
religious leaders' excommunicating, denouncing or otherwise sanctioning members of their
religious group, id. at 68; (3) entering into a contract or commercial enterprise as a religious
group, id.; (4) performing religious rites or installing religious images in government institu-
tions, Gsovski, supra note 144, at 19; and (5) appropriation or concealment of a religious
group's valuables, G. ZHELEZNOGORSKII, supra note 25, at 66, 74.
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struing article 142,222 the following are also criminal offenses: (1) mass
distribution of notices, letters or pamphlets soliciting violation of the law
for religious reasons; 22 (2) committing fraudulent acts to arouse reli-
gious superstitions in the masses; 224 (3) organizing and conducting reli-
gious meetings, ceremonies, or processions that disrupt the public
order;225 and (4) any discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation or
attitude toward religion, including refusals to grant employment in or
admission to an educational institution, dismissals from work or school,
deprivations of privileges established by law, and any other limitations on
the rights of citizens.226
The penalty for article 142 violations is up to one year of corrective
labor or a fine of up to fifty rubles. According to the 1966 amendment,
subsequent violations are punishable by deprivation of freedom for up to
three years.227
Article 142 could be interpreted to cover state action, but is inter-
preted to cover individual action alone.22 8 Any apparent protection of
individual freedoms provided by article 142 is a nullity in practice. Arti-
cle 142 permits rather than prohibits state interference in religion.
Courts act on behalf of the state in banning individual actions that vio-
late separation of church and state.
Article 143 is also part of the enforcement mechanism for Soviet law
222. Edict of Mar. 16, 1966, Ved. Verkh. Soy. RSFSR (Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of
the RSFSR), No. 12, Item 221.
223. Id.
224. Id. One writer has interpreted this clause as a ban on the faking of miracles, an of-
fense under Imperial Russian law and under earlier Soviet law when performed with an incen-
diary motive. E. JOHNSON, supra note 133, at 101.
Another commentator has construed the provision to prohibit preaching the biblical in-
terpretation of creation, as a well as religious cures, miracles, and prophesies. G. GOL'ST,
supra note 32, at 87. Because the terms "fraudulent acts" and "religious superstitions" are so
vague, however, almost any interpretation of this prohibition could be valid.
225. SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 120, at 81. Again, this provision can be inter-
preted broadly to ban any religious gatherings outside a prayer building. Johnson views it as
the authorities' response to the militant activities of Baptist groups, such as processions to
rivers for public baptisms and hymn-singing on public transportation. E. JOHNSON, supra note
133, at 101.
226. SoVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 120, at 81-82. This provision seems to provide
comprehensive protection of religious belief, but according to one commentator, it merely ech-
oes parts of earlier legislation. E. JOHNSON, supra note 133, at 101. Moreover, although it
protects religious belief, it does not even mention religious worship. Most importantly, the
authorities ignore this provision in practice. V. KUROYEDOV, supra note 34.
227. SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 120, at 81.
228. In theory, if the legal system enforced the clause prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of religious affiliation, article 142 could curb state infringement of individual rights. In
practice, the legal system focuses on enforcing the clauses that restrict the religious activities of
individuals. See supra notes 134-86 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10
Soviet and American Religious Law
on religion. Article 143 imposes criminal penalties for unnecessary inter-
ference with religious rights. It prohibits interference with religious wor-
ship that does not threaten the social order or the rights of other
citizens.22 9 Violations are punishable by up to six months of corrective
labor or by social censure.
2 30
Article 143 seems to provide a strong safeguard for religious free-
dom. In practice, however, it fails to protect religious rights in two re-
spects. First, the provision does not specify who is prohibited from
interfering with religious observance. Because the state is above the law
and is not mentioned in the statute, article 143 regulates individual activ-
ity and not state authorities such as those of the KGB. Second, article
143 prohibits interference only with religious observance that does not
undermine the social order and others' rights. Thus, article 143 still
sanctions interference if religious worship endangers these interests.
In summary, the Soviet Constitution proclaims sweeping guarantees
of religious rights. Nevertheless, the legislation implementing these guar-
antees narrows these rights. The criminal laws on religion, as well as the
decrees on religious associations and separation of church and state,
demonstrate substantive limitations on religious freedom. These limita-
tions illustrate a bias towards promoting the state interest in repressing
religious activities.
b. The American Context
Because of an underlying ideology that favors diversity of belief, in-
cluding religious belief, the American legal system reinforces rather than
restricts religious rights conferred by the Constitution. Unlike Soviet
law, American law has safeguards against government interference with
religion.
The United States Supreme Court has played a significant role in
the development of these safeguards. Two Supreme Court cases, Reyn-
olds v. United States231 and Davis v. Beason,232 reiterate the constitu-
tional constraint on the passage of laws preventing the free exercise of
religion. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,233 the Court upheld the right to
229. RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE art. 143.
230. Id. Social censure is the public condemnation of the guilty party by a court. Theguilt
of the accused may also be brought to public notice "where necessary" through the newspapers
or other means. Criminal Legislation, art. 28; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 2, at 169.
231. 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1879).
232. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
233. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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proselytize, a riqht that died in the Soviet Union with the amendments to
the republics' constitutions in 1929.234
Four other Supreme Court cases secure religious liberties which are
either unprotected by or, in fact, violative of Soviet law. The first, Mi-
nersville School District v. Govitis,235 protects the right of citizens to exer-
cise their religious beliefs even if, in so doing, they offend the religious
beliefs of others.236 Offending others' religious beliefs violates Article 39
of the Soviet Constitution. Article 39 states that "[e]njoyment by citizens
of their rights and freedoms must not ... infringe the rights of other
citizens. 237
In the second case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,238 the Court established that
parents have the right to direct the religious education of their children.
The state may intervene only if parents jeopardize the health and safety
of their children.239 The Soviet Code on Marriage and the Family pro-
hibits parents from giving religious instruction to their children.2'" The
third case, In re Gault,241 holds that the Bill of Rights and fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution protect children, as well as
adults. In the Soviet Union, the decree on religious associations requires
that members of religious groups be at least eighteen years old;242 accord-
ingly, children cannot exercise religious rights in the Soviet Union.
Finally, Engel v. Vitale2 4 3 holds that religious belief is protected
against state intrusion and is invulnerable to change in political leader-
ship. In the Soviet Union, in contrast, the state determines the scope of
constitutional rights, and the constitution changes according to the pri-
234. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Until 1929, the constitutions of the constit-
uent republics conferred the right to conduct religious as well as antireligious propaganda. E.
JOHNSON, supra note 133, at 99. In 1929 in the wake of the religious persecution of 1927-1928,
the regime substituted the right to conduct religious propaganda with the phrase "freedom of
religious persuasion," while the right to conduct antireligious propaganda remained intact.
This amendment secured only the right to religious belief, not the right to worship or
proselytize.
235. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
236. Id.
237. KONST. SSSR art. 39 (1977) (USSR).
238. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
239. Id. The threat to health envisioned by the United States Supreme Court is physical
rather than psychological. This concern does not equate with the social or ideological threat
addressed by article 227 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. See supra notes 198-204 and accompa-
nying text.
240. See supra notes 182, 196 and accompanying text.
241. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
242. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
243. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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orities of the current regime.2"
Judicial interpretation of the establishment clause has secured addi-
tional protection for American religious liberties. American courts rec-
ognize a "no entanglement" requirement that prohibits direct state
interference in internal religious affairs. 45 The Supreme Court has held
that the first amendment commands strict neutrality on the part of gov-
ernment towards religion. The state can neither aid nor cripple reli-
gion.46 The Court has reasoned that state interference with religion
would destroy American government and degrade religion. 47 In addi-
tion, the Court has associated government-established religions with reli-
gious persecution.248
The Supreme Court has developed a test to determine whether a
statute violates the establishment clause. Under this test, Government
action that meaningfully aids religion constitutes impermissible establish-
ment of religion unless: (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its primary effect
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not create excessive
entanglement between government and religion.249 Thus, the Jefferso-
nian concept of a wall separating church and state has been eroded.
Under this test, legislation can aid religion, so long as it has a nonreli-
gious purpose and only incidentally benefits or restricts religion.
In addition, state policies can pass constitutional muster even if they
244. See supra note 234, infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text. Soviet leaders initiate
the enactment of new constitutions to conform not so much with changing legal principles but
rather with their political viewpoint and personal vision of Soviet society. In drafting the 1918
Constitution, Lenin's primary purpose was to establish the Soviet regime. He intended the
1924 Constitution to standardize the law for all the constituent republics after the Civil War
following the 1917 Revolution. Stalin used the Constitution of 1936 to consolidate his power
and to legitimize his theory of law and the state. The current constitution was proposed by
Khrushchev as part of his de-Stalinization campaign. A. UNGER, supra note 98, at 79-83, 174-
75. Brezhnev ensured the promulgation of the Constitution in 1977 in part to reinforce his
orthodox view of socialist legality, in order to counter a trend toward capitalist innovation in
the economy. Markovits, supra note 23, at 600, 616.
The United States Constitution is not immutable either, and is subject to change through
the amendment process. Public policy or opinion can spur a movement to amend the Consti-
tution, as in the case of the attempt to pass the Equal Rights Amendment. Unlike Soviet
amendments, however, American amendments do not reflect the platform of a particular party
or leader. Moreover, American constitutional amendments tend to strengthen rather than
weaken basic guarantees. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting state or federal gov-
ernments' denial or abridgement of right to vote on basis of race) with 1929 amendment to
constitution of constituent republics (abridging free exercise of religion); see supra note 229.
245. L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 868-69.
246. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
247. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-32.
248. Id.
249. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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promote a particular religious value. In Marsh v. Chambers,250 the
Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening
each of its sessions with a prayer conducted by a chaplain paid by the
state. The Court held that the drafters of the United States Constitution
viewed invocations as conduct whose effect merely coincides with, rather
than promotes, tenets of any particular religion or religion in general.25'
Marsh enables state governments to advance religious principles "in-
directly" without violating the establishment clause. Similarly, the So-
viet state fosters atheism through enactment of restrictive laws on
religion, without violating the Soviet constitutional provisions on free-
dom of conscience. In advancing the particular ideological value of reli-
gion, Marsh parallels the Soviet legislation implementing the religious
guarantees of the Soviet Constitution. Marsh demonstrates a trend in
American constitutional law away from strict separation of church and
state. Increasingly, the encouragement of religion is viewed favorably as
long as the goals of plurality and nonfavoritism are maintained.
The first crack in the wall between church and state appeared in the
1971 Supreme Court decision of Gillette v. United States. 25 2 In Gillette,
the Court cautioned against taking the metaphor of the wall too liter-
ally.253 The Court did specify minimum standards for government com-
pliance with the establishment clause. According to the majority, "when
government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must be secular
in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary impact." '254
This standard ensures state neutrality toward religion.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,255 the Court treated the division between
church and state as a blurred, variable line, the exact parameters of
which must be determined in light of all the circumstances of a particular
case.25 6 In Lemon, the Court held that state action violates the establish-
ment clause only if it involves sponsorship of religion, financial support
of religion, or active involvement of political leaders in religious
250. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
251. Id. This interpretation applies in the criminal context as well. In criminal cases, this
approach poses less of a threat to the principles of the establishment clause and serves legiti-
mate policy goals that promote the public safety and welfare. For example, in Committee for
Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the Court held that a
state can pass laws prohibiting larceny without establishing those religions which also forbid
larceny.
252. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
253. Id. at 450.
254. Id. (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222).
255. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
256. Id. at 614.
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activity.257
The Lemon standard is fairly narrow and has been interpreted only
to exclude state conduct that clearly advances particular religious beliefs.
Lynch v. Donnelly,258 a 1984 Supreme Court case, provides a striking
demonstration of this willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to
breach the wall between church and state. In Lynch, the Court upheld
the right of a government entity, the city council of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, to subsidize the display of a nativity scene in front of a public
building.25 9 In support of the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger re-
ferred to the history of official invocations and the value of divine gui-
dance. In addition, he relied on the deliberations and pronouncements of
the drafters of the Constitution. 2 ° Chief Justice Burger also noted that
the federal government supports art galleries that display religious paint-
ings without violating the establishment clause.26 1 He argued that the
Court has never construed the establishment clause to require absolute
separation of church and state.2 62
Probably the key factor for the Court in reaching its decision in
Lynch was the finding of a secular purpose. The Court did not believe
that the creche promoted religious belief. Rather, the majority compared
the creche as analogous to Christmas trees, which serve a commercial
purpose in the sense of commemorating a holiday and depicting its ori-
gins.263 The Court held that the nativity scene did not directly benefit
any particular religion. 2 "
The Court's contention that a creche does not promote religious be-
liefs is untenable. A creche has no clearly secular purpose. Its primary
effect is to reaffirm a specific faith. It commemorates the birth of the
Christian Messiah. As Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent,265 it is diffi-
cult not to see the majority's opinion as an endorsement of Christianity.
The city's display of the crdhe explicitly discriminated against non-
257. Id. at 612.
258. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 673-75.
261. Id. at 676-77.
262. Id. at 673. The Court reiterated the holding in Lemon that total separation of church
and state is not possible. Id. at 672. "It has never been thought either possible or desirable to
enforce a regime of total separation .. " Id. at 673 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760). Finally,
the majority stated that the Constitution does not require complete separation of church and
state. Id. at 673.
263. Id. at 671.
264. Id. at 680-83.
265. Id. at 711-12.
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Christian faiths.266
An evenly-divided Court affirmed a Second Circuit ruling subse-
quent to Lynch.2 67 The Second Circuit had held in McCreary v. Stone268
that a municipality's display of a nativity scene in its parks at Christmas
time did not violate the establishment clause.269 The court noted that the
municipality used its parks for a wide variety of activities and displays,
that it had allowed the display in the past, and that it had incurred no
extra cost in displaying the creche.27°
The municipality's display of a nativity scene represented an en-
dorsement of a particular faith. A violation of the separation principle
should not be excused by the fact that the municipality used its parks for
other activities, that it had displayed the creche in the past, or that it had
incurred no extra cost in displaying the creche.
Arguably, the McCreary court extended Lynch because it refused to
distinguish Lynch based on the subject matter of the display. The display
at issue in Lynch was more commercial. It included a Santa Claus house,
reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, and candy-striped poles; in McCreary the
creche stood alone. In reading Lynch broadly to validate the display of
the creche, McCreary condoned state endorsement of religion that had
no content-based justification.271
Two other recent decisions demonstrate the new trend in separation
of church and state cases. In Mueller v. Allen,2 72 a five to four Court
upheld a statute granting a deduction to parents of children attending
nonprofit schools, whether private or public. Ninety-five percent of the
Minnesota statute's benefits went to parents of parochial school stu-
dents.2 7 3 In effect, the statute gives a direct incentive to parents to send
their children to parochial as opposed to other nonprofit schools. This
benefit has the same effect as direct state sponsorship of religion.274
266. Id. Paintings exhibited in a state-owned gallery do not have the same establishment
implications as state-sponsored display of a creche. Religious paintings in a museum are dis-
played purely as art, together with many collections of secular works. The creche, in contrast,
is displayed alone as a symbol of one of the most holy events in the history of a particular
religion.
267. Board of Trustees of the Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
268. 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 83.
269. Id. at 718-20.
270. Id. at 725.
271. Id. at 728-29.
272. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
273. Id. at 391.
274. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), for language indicating that gov-
ernment benefits to religion like those at issue in Mueller violate the establishment clause.
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In the second case, Wallace v. Jaffree,2 75 the Supreme Court voted
six to three to invalidate an Alabama statute authorizing a moment of
silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer. The major-
ity viewed the statute as motivated solely by a religious purpose.2 76
The breakdown of the vote suggests that the Court would uphold a
school prayer statute under different circumstances, however. Justice
Powell concurred separately to make clear that the case was decided nar-
rowly.2 7 7 Justice O'Connor also indicated that she would uphold a stat-
ute which provided for a moment of silence for meditation or prayer, if
the promulgating legislature demonstrated some plausible secular pur-
pose or disclaimed any religious purpose.278
In a subsequent case, Justice O'Connor and the three dissenters in
Wallace may contribute to a majority in favor of a statute allowing for
moments of silence in public schools. The Court would then be condon-
ing state conduct that directly promotes religious activity.
The accommodation principle279 represents another intrusion into
the separation of church and state doctrine. Judicial accommodation of
religion arguably violates the establishment clause.280 Accommodation
occurs when a government regulation resting on a state interest unrelated
to religion conflicts with behavior required by religious belief. When a
court intervenes and creates an exemption from the regulation for believ-
ers, it is said to be accommodating their religion.281
Accommodation promotes free exercise of religion by not forcing
believers to sacrifice conduct essential to their religious observance. At
the same time, accommodation favors particular religious groups, poten-
tially violating the establishment clause. This tension between free exer-
cise and establishment demonstrates a basic inconsistency in American
law.2
8 2
275. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
276. Id. at 48.
277. Id. at 62.
278. Id. at 83-84. It is difficult to imagine how a statute authorizing prayer in public
schools could have a secular purpose. Even if the statute had no clearly secular purpose, under
Justice O'Connor's very low standard of review, it would be held constitutional if the state
merely articulated that the statute had no religious purpose.
279. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
280. The inherent conflict in accommodation between promoting free exercise and estab-
lishing religion never arises under Soviet law. The Soviet state intervenes in religion not to
promote it but to weaken it, and state action is not restrained by law. The state can act at will.
281. G. GUNTHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1581 (10th ed. 1980). See also L.
TRIBE, supra note 110, at 855 (discussing justification for accommodation).
282. The Supreme Court has not reconciled the conflict between free exercise and establish-
ment inherent in the accommodation principle. The Court has also failed to establish a consis-
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The classic accommodation case is Wisconsin v. Yoder.283 In Yoder,
the Court exempted Amish children past the eighth grade from the state
requirement to attend high school. The Court granted the exemption
despite the strong state interest in compulsory education.284 The Court
recognized that Amish parents had to keep their children out of the
mainstream high school system to ensure the integrity of the Amish faith
and way of life.285
The Court's exemption ensured the survival of the Amish religion.
At the same time, however, the Court's exemption favored the Amish
faith over all other religions in that it gave the Amish an exclusive excep-
tion from a state law.
In summary, the American government has established religion to
the extent that the case law has undermined the separation between
church and state. Recent decisions have shown a marked disrespect for
tent standard for applying the accommodation doctrine. Instead, the Court has engaged in
random accommodation.
A recently decided case, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985),
presented an opportunity to address the conflict. In Thornton, a Connecticut statute mandated
that all employers grant a day off to their employees on their Sabbath, regardless of the possi-
ble burden on employers or other employees. In an eight to one decision, the Court struck
down the statute as an establishment of religion. The Court held that the statute's primary
purpose was to promote the particular religious practice of observing a day of rest. Id. at 708-
09.
The Supreme Court could have upheld the statute. Although the statute had a religious
purpose, it promoted the same practice that the Court had upheld in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), and had approved in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Sherbert
established a statutory exemption to the unemployment law for a Seventh Day Adventist who
refused to accept a job with Saturday hours. The Court held that she could continue to receive
benefits, despite her refusal to accept employment. Braunfeld upheld a Sunday closing law
against a claim by Orthodox Jewish retailers for an exemption. Had the Court upheld the law
in Thornton, it would have advanced free exercise without posing any greater threat to estab-
lishment of religion or religious liberty than that presented by the rulings in Sherbert and
Braunfeld.
Rather than attempt to resolve the conflict between the religion clauses, the Court could
adopt the position approach outlined in a recent law review Note. Note, Rebuilding the Wall:
The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COL. L. REv.
1463 (1981). The author of the Note, Steve Gey, completely rejects accommodation and advo-
cates a strict neutrality approach. Gey claims that he has a "unitary view" of the religion
clauses. Id. at 1490. He achieves this unitary view, however, by shrinking the free exercise
clause into the establishment clause. He favors preventing any establishment over ensuring
free exercise in special cases, because of the problems inherent in balancing these two concepts.
Id.
Gey argues against any accommodation as a violation, although indirect, of the establish-
ment clause. Id. at 1485, 1490. Under Gey's theory, courts could not grant statutory exemp-
tions for a discrete group of believers who cannot exercise their religious beliefs under the law.
283. 406 U.S. 205.
284. Id. at 234.
285. Id. at 211.
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the separation principle; this trend has resulted in state promotion of reli-
gious interests. In contrast, Soviet law has advanced atheism to the ex-
tent that the law has weakened the separation between church and state.
Soviet implementing legislation shows an erosion of the separation prin-
ciple that has resulted in state promotion of atheism.
4. Procedural Enforcement of Constitutional Rights: The Soviet
Versus the American Version
a. Need for Implementation of Soviet Rights Versus Self-
Implementation of American Rights
Soviet constitutional rights are not self-executing. They require im-
plementing legislation.286 In other words, Soviet constitutional rights
cannot stand alone and are unenforceable unless supported by a statute.
The implementing legislation can delineate, alter, or carve out exceptions
to rights.287 The implementing legislation often limits these rights.2 88
Thus, the Soviet government proclaims that it guarantees important legal
rights, but at the same time ensures passage of legislation that limits their
scope and significance.
The requirement for legislation to implement Soviet constitutional
rights has several implications. Without the decrees on religious associa-
tions and on separation of church and state, the religion clauses in article
52 would be unenforceable. The power of the implementing legislation
to shape constitutional guarantees explains how and why these decrees
restrict religious freedoms.
In the American system, there is no wholesale requirement for legis-
lation implementing constitutional rights. American rights are self-exe-
cuting. They exist independently under the Constitution, subject only to
interpretation by the courts. Although the courts define the scope of
religious rights,289 they are bound at least to consider precedent and to
address the intentions of the founders. Unlike the Soviet leadership,
American courts cannot make decisions arbitrarily.
Like the Soviet implementing legislation, courts in the United States
strive to strike a balance between individual religious rights and state
interests.290 In contrast to the Soviet system, American courts alone
strike this balance. They can act as a check on other branches of govern-
286. See I. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 77, at 53-54.
287. Markovits, supra note 69, at 523-24 & n.50.
288. See supra notes 134-82 and accompanying text.
289. See infra notes 300-43 and accompanying text.
290. Id.
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ment. When another branch of the American government infringes or
denies a right guaranteed by the Constitution, the courts grant redress to
the injured party. Moreover, American legislation implementing consti-
tutional guarantees tends to expand rather than restrict individual free-
doms.2 9 1 In the Soviet Union, in contrast, the executive and legislative
branches play the most important role in weighing individual rights and
state interests. Soviet courts cannot counterbalance the influence of
other branches of government.
Differences between the socialist and bourgeois philosophies of
human rights account for the nearly total dissimilarity between the two
systems' implementation of religious rights. The Soviets define rights by
reference to the state's judgment of what is good for society. An individ-
ual earns an entitlement by performing obligations to society. The imple-
menting legislation requirement demonstrates the state's right to
determine the scope of individual freedoms. In short, rights do not exist
unless the state decides that citizens have earned them, and the rights
that do exist are defined by the state.
Americans, in contrast, see rights as unencumbered entitlements.
Consequently, constitutional rights are self-executing. They exist in-
dependent of legislative acts. Implementing legislation that does exist
expands on the framework outlined in the Constitution.
b. Rights as Limits on the State
(1) The Soviet Context
In the Soviet Union, the state has a constitutional entitlement
greater than that of the individual. Although the individual possesses
rights under the Constitution, the state has the power to define those
rights and direct their implementation. Article 39 of the Soviet Constitu-
tion states that "[c]itizens of the USSR enjoy in full the social, economic,
political and personal rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaranteed by
the Constitution of the USSR and by Soviet laws." '2 92 Two sentences
later, however, this broad guarantee is qualified by the following clause:
"Enjoyment by citizens of their rights and freedoms must not be to the
detriment of the interests of society or the state. ...
291. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1983), broad-
ens the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. The Civil Rights Act specifies the contexts in which all persons are to be treated equally
under the law. The Act bars discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin in
housing, public accommodations, and public schools.
292. KONST. SSSR art. 39 (1977) (USSR).
293. Id.
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This provision permits comprehensive subordination of the individ-
ual interest to that of the state. The Soviet Constitution bars exercising
one's rights in a way that interferes with the interests of society and the
state. The Communist Party has complete discretion to interpret the
public interest.294 The Party can construe any behavior which does not
promote the state interest as detrimental to that interest.
Article 59 directly links the exercise of individual rights with the
performance of duties. Its first clause reads: "Citizens' exercise of their
rights and freedoms is inseparable from the performance of their duties
and obligations." 95 The 1977 Constitution has eleven articles2 9 6 de-
lineating citizens' duties.297
Under article 59, citizens can claim their individual rights only if
they fulfill their constitutional obligations to the state. In theory, if citi-
zens refuse to perform these duties or if the state finds them remiss in this
effort, the state could limit their individual rights. Furthermore, the
state could determine that an individual's exercise of a constitutional
right conflicts with fulfilling a constitutional duty owed to the state. The
state could rely on this conflict of interest as a pretext for restricting
individual freedoms. For example, the state could curtail a citizen's reli-
gious observance by labeling it either antisocial or contrary to the stan-
dards of socialist conduct, in violation of article 9.
294. A. UNGER, supra note 98, at 199. See infra notes 295-356 and accompanying text.
295. KONST. SSSR art. 59 (1977) (USSR). Soviet scholars consider this linkage laudable
because it parallels the identity of individual and collective interests in communist theory. One
scholar justifies this approach by contending that "the individual is given a bigger share, and
more responsibility, in managing the affairs of state." According to this theory, the more
obligations individuals owe to the state, and the more their interests align with those of the
state, then the greater will be the role they play in society and state affairs. Tikhomirov, Con-
stitution of the Soviet State of the Whole People (Problems of the Contemporary World No. 68,
1978).
296. There were only five in the 1936 Constitution.
297. KONST. SSSR art. 59-69 (1977) (USSR). Soviet citizens have the duty: (1) to observe
the Constitution and Soviet laws, to comply with the standards of socialist conduct, and to
uphold the honor and dignity of Soviet citizenship (article 59); (2) to work conscientiously in a
socially useful occupation, and to strictly observe labor discipline (article 60); (3) to preserve
and protect socialist property, and to combat embezzlement of state property (article 61); (4)
to safeguard and promote the interests of the Soviet state, and to defend the Socialist Mother-
land (article 62); (5) to serve in the armed forces (article 63); (6) to respect the national dignity
of other citizens, and to promote friendship among the different nationalities in the USSR
(article 64); (7) to respect the rights and lawful interests of other persons, to be uncompromis-
ing towards antisocial behavior, and to help maintain public order (article 65); (8) to train their
children for socially useful work and to raise them as worthy members of socialist society
(article 66); (9) to protect nature and conserve its riches (article 67); (10) to preserve historical
monuments and other cultural values (article 68); and (11) to promote friendship and coopera-
tion with peoples of other lands (article 69).
1987]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
Under article 59, almost any state-alleged dereliction of duty could
justify deprivation of a constitutional right.298 The Soviet system has no
real equivalent to the American requirement that the government must
have a "compelling state interest" to interfere with an individual's exer-
cise of a constitutional right.299
(2) The American Context
Unlike Soviet constitutional rights, American constitutional rights
are not conditioned on the performance of duties owed to the state.
American rights resemble Soviet rights, however, in that they are not
absolute barriers to state infringement. In the United States, judicial im-
plementation of the Constitution has created a hierarchy of rights and
state interests. Courts balance individual against state interests to define
the scope of rights on a case-by-case basis.3" In certain cases, individu-
als have more limited rights because of the magnitude of the government
interest involved. If the state can show a compelling government inter-
est, the state can limit individual rights.3"'
The state has an interest in prohibiting conduct that society deems
morally blameworthy. States have successfully asserted this interest to
justify restriction of religious conduct. Courts have upheld criminal pen-
alties for certain conduct associated with religious belief have been up-
held under this governmental interest rationale. Examples include Hill v.
State,302 prohibiting the use of poisonous snakes in church services;
Reynolds v. United States,313 banning polygamy and bigamy in the Mor-
mon Church; United States v. Kuch 3o and Gaskin v. Tennessee,3°5 bar-
ring the use of marijuana or LSD in religious ceremonies; and Kennedy v.
Bureau of Narcotics,3 6 refusing to extend the right to use peyote in reli-
298. A. UNGER, supra note 98, at 200.
299. See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Gaskin v. Tennessee, 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1973); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
301. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Gaskin, 490 S.W.2d at 521;
Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956).
302. 38 Ala. App. at 404, 88 So. 2d at 880.
303. 98 U.S. at 145.
304. 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
305. 490 S.W.2d at 521.
306. 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973). According to Tribe:
"Church of the Awakening" could not be granted the same exemption for peyote use
in bona fide religious ceremonies as enjoyed by members of the Native American
Church, not because "Church of the Awakening" members were not Indians or be-
cause peyote was not as central to their religion as to Peyotism-although both were
true-but because an amended regulation exempting petitioners would still fail to
exempt other churches using peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies. ...
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gious rituals to a group other than the Native American Church.
An American court has also ruled that a state can restrict prisoners'
religious rights because the state has a strong interest in maintaining dis-
cipline and order in its prisons. In Theriault v. Silber,3 °7 a prisoner in the
Atlanta, Georgia federal penitentiary acquired a Doctor of Divinity cer-
tificate through a mail-order application. 308 He then organized his own
religion and called it the "Church of the New Song."30 9 Theriault, the
founder, claimed to be Jesus Christ.3 1
0
The prison chaplains doubted the sincerity of Theriault's religious
beliefs. They refused to grant his requests for chapel time. Conse-
quently, Theriault filed complaints against chaplains at the Atlanta
prison and at the federal penitentiary in La Tuna, Texas, where he was
subsequently transferred.
The district court held that Theriault's sect was not a religion, but
rather "a masquerade designed to obtain First Amendment protection
for acts which otherwise would be unlawful and/or reasonably disal-
lowed by the various prison authorities." ' According to the court,
Theriault had organized the sect solely to promote an unstructured, ni-
hilistic philosophy for the purpose of disrupting the prison.31 2 The court
held that prison officials may impose reasonable and necessary restraints
on inmates, especially where, as in this case, the prisoner posed a high
risk to prison discipline.313
Theriault demonstrates another limitation on the scope of American
religious rights. In order to be enforceable, a religious belief must be
sincere. Courts will inquire into the sincerity of an individual's religious
conviction, if it is in doubt, before deciding the merits of the case.31 4
The Supreme Court has imposed more subtle limitations on free ex-
ercise by refusing to accommodate religious belief in several cases. In
these cases, the Court, like the Soviet government, has recognized that
under certain circumstances the state interest outweighs the interest of
L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 858 n.63.
307. 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
308. Id. at 256.
309. Id. at 259.
310. Id at 258.
311. 453 F. Supp. at 260.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 262.
314. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, - U.S. - , 107 S. Ct.
1046, 1047-48 & n.2 (1987) (in affording free exercise protection, Court stressed sincerity of
religious belief); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965) (Court granted protection to
persons who held a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies a place in [the believer's] life
... parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God"); L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 831.
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the individual. Under American law, however, the individual is given
some recognition even where accommodation is denied.
In Braunfeld v. Brown,315 a Sunday Sabbath closing law disadvan-
taged Jewish retailers who could not work on Saturdays because of their
faith. As a result, the Jewish merchants lost two business days every
week, as opposed to the one business day lost by Christian merchants.316
The Court refused to accommodate the plaintiffs' religious beliefs.3"7
The Court held that a compelling state interest in providing a uniform
day of rest, nullified the accommodation claim.318 The Court also held
that the state regulation constituted a mere minimization of business po-
tential, not a total denial of religious rights. The Sunday closing law
merely made the Jewish merchants' religious observance more expen-
sive.319 Braunfeld stands for the proposition that economic injury alone
cannot trigger accommodation. Braunfeld limits accommodation to the
few state laws that result in a total denial of religious rights.
United States v. Lee320 provides another example of refusal to ac-
commodate religious belief. In Lee the Court rejected the claim of an
Amish employer for an exemption from paying social security tax on
behalf of his employees. The plaintiff was Amish and employed only
other Amish. He had argued that compulsory payment of the tax pre-
vented him from fulfilling his religious obligation to provide assistance to
315. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
316. Id. at 603.
317. The Court has not overruled Braunfeld, although in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), the Court explicitly accommodated the religious belief of a Seventh Day Adventist
based on adverse economic impact of the state regulation. Justice Stewart, concurring in Sher-
bert, advocated overruling Braunfeld because of the inconsistency between the two decisions.
Id. at 417-18.
318. 366 U.S. at 603.
319. This rationale, however, applies equally to the facts in Sherbert, where the Court
reached an opposite result. In Sherbert, the plaintiff was denied unemployment compensation
because she refused to accept a job that would have required work on Saturdays, which her
faith did not permit. As Justice Stewart pointed out in his concurrence, this penalty amounted
to a minimization of economic benefit, not a total denial of religious rights. The plaintiff had
already received twenty-two weeks of benefits and would only lose a portion of her benefits if
she refused to take the job offer. Moreover, she could still try to find a job with no Saturday
work requirement. 374 U.S. at 417-18.
Perhaps the only way to distinguish Sherbert and Braunfeld is to focus on the state bene-
fit. In Braunfeld, the plaintiffs were not forced to choose between receiving a state benefit and
upholding their religious belief. They still had the "advantage" of Sunday closing, although it
favored someone else's faith, not theirs. They could not claim that the state had denied them
the benefit, only that the state had discriminated against them in framing the statute. In Sher-
bert, in contrast, the plaintiff had to choose between observing her faith and receiving a por-
tion, if not all, of a state benefit.
320. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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members of his faith.321
In support of its holding, the Court cited the strong governmental
interest in a nationwide social security system.322 The Court reasoned
that the system is comprehensive and cannot sustain the creation of ex-
emptions based on religious beliefs.323 The Court believed that differenti-
ating social security from general taxes might threaten the whole tax
system because people might refuse to pay particular taxes if they ob-
jected to them in any way.324
Braunfeld and Lee demonstrate the limitations of the accommoda-
tion principle. Only three Supreme Court cases have applied it. They
demonstrate the Court's reluctance to grant statutory exemptions based
on free exercise claims in the face of a compelling public goal. In the first
case, Sherbert v. Verner,325 the Court held that a Seventh-Day Adventist
could not be denied unemployment compensation because she refused to
accept a job requiring work on Saturdays in violation of her faith. In the
second case, Thomas v. Board of Indiana Employment Security Divi-
sion 326 the court held that a Jehovah's Witness could not be denied un-
employment benefits for leaving his job because of religious
convictions.327 In the third case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,328 previously dis-
cussed, the Supreme Court held that Amish parents may not be prose-
cuted for refusing to send their children to public school beyond the
eighth grade, despite a state law requiring school attendance until age
sixteen.329
Yoder could be read to broaden the accommodation principle, in the
sense that the Court required weighing the governmental interest not at
321. Id. at 254-55. But see supra note 283 and accompanying text.
322. 455 U.S. at 258.
323. Id. at 259-60.
324. Id. at 260. A federal statute exempts self-employed Amish, since they constitute a
narrow category that is readily identifiable. In the case of self-employed Amish, the statute
confines the exception to a particular religious community with its own welfare system. Unlike
an exemption for employers, an exemption for self-employed Amish does not affect others who
are not Amish. It does not risk imposing conditions of the employer's faith on employees who
do not share his or her belief. Id. at 255, 260-61.
325. 374 U.S. at 398.
326. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
327. In Thomas the plaintiff was forced by his employer to transfer to a munitions plant
when the local steel foundry closed. The plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, objected to armaments
production on the basis of his religious belief. Id. at 710.
328. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
329. This case contrasts sharply with Soviet law on separation of church and state. Soviet
law not only requires parents to send their children to state schools, it also severely restricts
parents' ability to give religious instruction to their children. See supra note 197 and accompa-
nying text.
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the general or abstract level, but in terms of the burden on the plaintiff.
Court review consequently becomes more particularized to take into ac-
count the plaintiff's individual circumstances. According to this view,
Yoder narrows the scope of the compelling state interest standard; a gen-
eral interest without more cannot be compelling. Further, the state has
the burden of proving its interest; mere "assertion, imagination, or anxi-
ety are insufficient. 330
The Yoder approach is undercut, however, by the fact that lower
courts have confused the doctrine or failed to follow it consistently.331
The Sixth Circuit, for example, has misinterpreted the focus of the bal-
ancing test. In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,332 the court
"read a requirement into the free exercise clause that the burdened reli-
gious practice be central or vital to plaintiff's religion,, 333 and found that
plaintiffs had not established this fact. Sequoyah, in weighing the state
interest in terms of the individual plaintiff rather than in the abstract,
served to constrict not expand the accommodation principle.
In Palmer v. Board of Educucation of the City of Chicago,334 another
appellate court upheld the dismissal of a kindergarten teacher who re-
fused, on the basis of her religious beliefs, to lead her class in the pledge
of allegiance, to teach her class patriotic songs, and to conduct activities
commemorating commonly observed holidays. 335 In applying the com-
pelling state interest standard, the Palmer court failed to determine
whether the school had an alternative means for fulfilling the functions
which the teacher had refused to perform.
In addition, the court did not adequately define the state's interest.
The court should not have considered: (1) the general fitness and dedica-
tion of all the school's teachers or of the plaintiff, (2) the government's
general power to prescribe the curriculum in public schools; or (3) the
state's general interest in conveying knowledge and appreciation of
America's national heritage. Instead, the court should have held that the
state's interest in the case was confined to conveying a patriotic attitude
to the students in the plaintiff's class. In view of this limited characteri-
zation of the state interest and the magnitude of the burden imposed on
the plaintiff by the state's conduct, the Palmer court could have justifia-
330. Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause--Some Reflections on Recent
Cases, 9 N. KY. L. Rnv. 265, 271-72 (1982).
331. Id. at 265-303.
332. 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
333. Pepper, supra note 330, at 282.
334. 466 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979).
335. Id. at 601.
[Vol. I0
Soviet and American Religious Law
bly accommodated plaintiff's religious beliefs.33 6
Possibly because of the difficulty courts have experienced in apply-
ing the Yoder standard, accommodation is in danger of abandonment by
the current Supreme Court. In Quaring v. Peterson, the state denied the
plaintiff a Nebraska driver's license because she refused to have her pho-
tograph taken for the license as required by state law.33 7 The plaintiff's
objection to being photographed stemmed from her literal interpretation
of the Second Commandment, which forbids the making of graven
images. She "believe[d] that the Commandment is violated by creating a
likeness of God's creation." '338 The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth
Circuit's decision to accommodate the plaintiff's religious beliefs, but
only by a four to four vote. Four Justices denied the plaintiff's free exer-
cise claim, despite the substantial burden on the plaintiff,339 and the com-
paratively modest state interest in quick and accurate identification.
Most recently, in two cases decided last Term, the Court rejected
the parties free exercise claims. In Goldman v. Weinberger,3" the Court
held an Air Force regulation requiring all persons to wear standard
uniforms should apply to an orthodox Jewish rabbi. The rabbi had worn
a yarmulke while on duty in violation of the regulation. The court held
that "the necessary habits of discipline and unity" '341 justified the imposi-
tion on the rabbi's religious observance.
In Bowen v. Roy,342 the Court held that a statute requiring a state
agency to use social security numbers in administering the federal food
stamp and Aid-to-Families-with-Dependent-Children program did not
violate the free exercise clause. The Court refused to accommodate the
religious beliefs of Native Americans whose faith prohibited them from
obtaining Social Security numbers. The Court held that the state statute
336. Pepper, supra note 330, at 272-73.
337. 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985)
(per curiam).
338. Id. at 1123. The Eighth Circuit commented that:
[The plaintiff's] belief extends beyond her refusal to allow her photograph to appear
on her driver's license. She believes the Second Commandment forbids her from
possessing any image having a likeness of anything in creation. She possesses no
photographs of her wedding or family, does not own a television set, and refuses to
allow decorations in her home that depict flowers, animals, or other creations in
nature. When she purchases food stuffs displaying pictures on their labels, she either
removes the label or obliterates the picture with a black marking pen.
Id. at 1123.
339. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam). Plaintiff either had to forego a
driver's license, an important benefit, or violate a fundamental precept of her religion.
340. - U.S. - , 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
341. Id. at 1313.
342. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
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did not violate the free exercise clause because it was facially neutral, and
promoted "a legitimate and important public interest." '343 Both
Goldman and Roy illustrate the reluctance of the current Supreme Court
to accommodate religious beliefs. In summary, rights are not absolute
barriers to state infringement in either the United States or the Soviet
Union. The degree of infringement, however, is much greater in the So-
viet Union than it is in the United States. This disparity stems from a
difference in the standard that triggers state interference in the two sys-
tems. In the Soviet Union, the state has an entitlement greater than that
of the individual under the Constitution. In the United States, the state
has an entitlement equal to that of the individual.
c. Procedural Protections in the Soviet and American
Legal Systems
The Soviet concept of rights imposes limits on individual as well as
on state action.344 The Soviet Constitution guarantees rights against in-
fringement by individuals as well as by the state. Because the degree of
infringement from a citizen's point of view is often the same, this provi-
sion of Soviet law establishes an area of protection in the Soviet system
that is potentially broader than the protection provided in the American
system.
In contrast, the United States Constitution guarantees rights only
against state interference. Individuals cannot sue under the Constitution
unless the state has acted in violation of their rights. This requirement is
known as the state action doctrine. Infringement by individuals cannot
trigger a constitutional violation.345
In practice, however, the Soviet Constitution does not safeguard in-
dividual rights against state interference. The state has the power to de-
fine and implement constitutional guarantees, and the state uses it to
restrict religious rights. The decrees on separation of church and state
and religious associations, as well as articles 70, 142, 143, and 227 of the
RSFSR Criminal Code, demonstrate the limitations on religious freedom
in the Soviet Union.346
Furthermore, individuals in the Soviet Union cannot sue the state
343. Id. at 2157.
344. See supra notes 293-301 and accompanying text.
345. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 354 (1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 1147 &
nn. 1-2.
346. See supra notes 128-82, 196-230 and accompanying text.
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for constitutional violations.347 Article 57 of the 1977 Constitution pro-
vides that state bodies, public organizations, and officials merely have a
duty to respect and protect citizens' rights and freedoms.348 Unlike the
first amendment, article 57 does not explicitly prohibit state entities and
officials from infringing individual rights. Article 57 does not create a
cause of action against the state for violation of constitutional guarantees.
Article 58 gives citizens the right to file complaints against state en-
tities and officials, and to appeal administrative decisions to a court.349
The relief conferred by article 58 is principally an administrative not a
judicial remedy, however. In contrast to the American system, only offi-
cial misconduct, not a statute ruled unconstitutional by a court, can trig-
ger the remedy. 50
Any review that does occur must comply with strict procedures es-
tablished by law. Unlike the procedural law governing American judicial
review, local Soviet procedural law can be drafted to limit judicial im-
pact.3  If the local government does not issue any procedural rules, the
right of review does not exist.352
Unlike the American system, the Soviet system has no procedural
limitations such as standing or mootness. The Soviet procedures them-
selves, however, are meaningless; individuals have little or no means of
enforcing the laws on religion against the state.353 Additionally, there
are no constraints on state action against individuals. The state does not
have to file an official complaint for administrative, civil, or criminal vio-
lations and can take immediate action.
In contrast, individuals in the American system can sue to enforce a
remedy against the state for a violation of their constitutional freedoms.
American rights are enforceable against the state, not just by the state.
They protect the interests of the individual as much as the interests of the
state.3 54 Unlike the Soviet Constitution, the American Constitution
erects an effective barrier against flagrant state infringement of individual
rights, including religious liberties.
American law limits the ability to bring a constitutional case
347. The lack of judicial redress for state violations of constitutional rights distinguishes
the Soviet from the American system. See infra notes 354-55 and accompanying text.
348. KONST. SSSR art. 57 (1977) (USSR).
349. Id. art. 58.
350. Markovits, supra note 23, at 616.
351. A. UNGER, supra note 98, at 198.
352. B. RAMUNDO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: A PRIMER 24-25 (1971).
353. Markovits, supra note 23, at 619-20.
354. Every American case cited herein arose as an action brought by individuals against
the state for infringement of their religious rights under the Constitution.
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through the procedural doctrines of standing and mootness. Unlike the
restrictions in the Soviet system, however, these doctrines do not pre-
clude all enforcement of basic rights by individuals. Standing and moot-
ness are intended to promote fairness and efficiency given the practical
limitations of the United States court system. Standing, for example, en-
sures that only those directly injured by the state action at issue can bring
suit.355 Mootness prevents the court from hearing a case involving an
issue already resolved by other circumstances or made obsolete by the
passage of time.356
V. CONCLUSION
Religious activity is treated differently under the Soviet and Ameri-
can Constitutions. This disparity in the law as applied has led to the
well-known differences in the actual treatment of religion. Religion en-
joys nearly unlimited freedom in the United States and is greatly re-
stricted in the Soviet Union. In the United States, individuals can
enforce their religious rights; such enforcement is virtually impossible in
the Soviet Union. These differences stem from divergence in the ideolo-
gies and political systems, as well as from divergence in Soviet and Amer-
ican law. However, the basic rights enumerated by the two constitutions,
freedom of religion and separation of church and state, are substantially
the same.
The Soviet and American legal systems treat religion similarly in
some respects, despite drastically different ideological and political foun-
dations. In terms of free exercise, both legal systems restrict religious
freedom. The difference, as great as it is, is merely one of degree. In
terms of the doctrine of separation of church and state, both systems
violate the separation principle. The difference in approach lies in the
target of state bias. The Soviet system favors state interests almost exclu-
sively. The American system attempts to balance state and individual
interests, but tends to favor individual interests.
355. Parties can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if it impinges upon their
own rights. Parties cannot argue that the statute would be unconstitutional if applied to others
in hypothetical situations. Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
In addition, parties must allege an injury that a constitutional guarantee seeks to prevent.
The corporate owner of a department store, for example, has no standing to attack a Sunday
closing law as a violation of free exercise of religion, if the statute inflicts only economic injury
to the owner. The owner has standing, however, to attack the statute as a violation of separa-
tion of church and state. Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582 (1961).
356. Burke v. Barnes, - U.S. _, 107 S. Ct. 734, 736 (1987); United States Parole Comm'n
v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1980); L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 62-63.
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Conventionally, the two legal systems are seen as irreconcilably dif-
ferent. In fact, in some ways they are comparable. Likewise, the conven-
tional view is that American law guarantees virtually unlimited religious
freedom and complete separation of church and state; this conception,
too, is untenable.

